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DEBATE: S.18 Foreign Assistance Reform, Prioritization, and Conditionality Act of 2025

Grant

Member
The Senate will now to come to order to consider the following bill, debate will continue until cloture is invoked or the bill is withdrawn.


S.18

119th CONGRESS​



IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MANNING of IDAHO introduces (for herself and others);

​


A BILL​

To reform the provision of United States official development assistance by reducing overall funding levels by approximately one-half, redirecting resources toward capital expenditure and infrastructure projects that promote sustained economic growth and opportunity, and conditioning assistance on measurable progress toward democratic governance and free-market reforms, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,




SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Foreign Assistance Reform, Prioritization, and Conditionality Act of 2025” or the “FARPCA Act.”


SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:—

(1) Official development assistance (ODA) provided by the United States has too often prioritized short-term consumption, recurrent costs, and diffuse social programming over durable capital investments that generate long-term economic growth.​
​
(2) Sustainable poverty reduction and expanded opportunity in developing countries are most effectively advanced through productive infrastructure, private-sector development, and policies that protect property rights, enforce contracts, and open markets.​
​
(3) Assistance that is not conditioned on democratic standards and free-market reforms risks subsidizing authoritarian governance, corruption, and economic stagnation.​
​
(4) A substantial reduction in overall ODA volume, combined with tighter focus and stricter conditionality, will improve effectiveness, increase accountability to the American taxpayer, and better align assistance with United States national interests.​


SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:—

(1) ODA means official development assistance as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee.​
​
(2) Capital expenditure means outlays for the acquisition, construction, or major rehabilitation of fixed assets, including physical infrastructure, that have a useful life of more than one year and are expected to generate ongoing economic returns.​
​
(3) Eligible infrastructure means projects in transportation (roads, ports, railways, airports), energy generation and transmission (including reliable and affordable power), water and sanitation systems, digital connectivity, and logistics facilities that demonstrably expand economic productivity and private-sector opportunity.​
​
(4) Democratic standards means free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law, protection of fundamental political and civil liberties, an independent judiciary, and civilian control of the military, as assessed by the Secretary of State using objective, publicly available indicators.​
​
(5) Free-market reforms means measurable progress toward secure private property rights, enforcement of contracts, reduction of barriers to entry and trade, fiscal discipline, sound monetary policy, and an enabling environment for domestic and foreign private investment, as assessed by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Trade Representative.​


SECTION 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; OVERALL FUNDING LEVEL.
(a) Authorization.—There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2026 and each fiscal year thereafter such sums as may be necessary for ODA programs administered by the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (or any successor entity), and other agencies, provided that the total amount of new budget authority for ODA in any fiscal year shall not exceed 50 percent of the average annual ODA volume provided by the United States in calendar years 2022 through 2024 (approximately $31.5 billion in current dollars, adjusted annually for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index).

(b) Limitation.—No funds appropriated under this Act or any other Act may be used for ODA in excess of the ceiling established in subsection (a).

(a) Initial Funding Ceiling.—For fiscal years 2026 through 2029, total new budget authority for ODA shall not exceed 50 percent of the average annual ODA volume provided by the United States in calendar years 2022 through 2024, adjusted annually for inflation.

(b) Quadrennial Review.—Not later than March 1, 2029, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to Congress a review evaluating—

(1) savings achieved under the funding ceiling;​
​
(2) changes in program effectiveness;​
​
(3) changes in private capital leveraged;​
​
(4) the effect on United States influence relative to strategic competitors;​
​
(5) the effect on access to critical infrastructure, strategic minerals, trade corridors, and emerging markets;​
​
(6) the effect on humanitarian response capacity; and​
​
(7) whether continuation, modification, or expiration of the funding ceiling best serves the national interest.​

(c) Reauthorization.—The funding ceiling established under subsection (a) shall expire at the end of fiscal year 2029 unless Congress expressly reauthorises or modifies it by law.

(d) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall prevent Congress from appropriating additional funds in response to war, humanitarian emergency, national security contingency, or strategic competition where expressly authorized by law.



SECTION 5. PRIORITIZATION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Primary Purpose.—Not less than 70 percent of all ODA funds made available under this Act shall be obligated for capital expenditure on eligible infrastructure projects that are designed to expand economic productivity, create employment, and generate measurable returns on investment.

(a) Primary Purpose.—

(1) Not less than 60 percent of all ODA funds made available under this Act shall be obligated for capital expenditure, eligible infrastructure, private-sector development, or other activities that demonstrably expand economic productivity, trade, investment, energy security, or employment.​
​
(2) The Secretary of State may reduce the requirement under paragraph (1) for a specific country or program to not less than 40 percent if the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—​
​
(A) strict compliance would materially impair an important national security or strategic objective of the United States;​
​
(B) alternative assistance is likely to produce greater measurable economic, governance, or security returns; and​
​
(C) the assistance remains consistent with the purposes of this Act.​
​
(3) Any use of authority under paragraph (2) shall be accompanied by a written justification and measurable performance objectives.​

(b) Prohibited Uses.—Funds may not be used for—

(1) recurrent operating or personnel costs of recipient governments or non-governmental organizations, except for a limited period of project start-up not to exceed 24 months;​
​
(2) direct budget support or cash transfers unrelated to specific capital projects;​
​
(3) programs whose primary purpose is short-term humanitarian relief, social service delivery, or ideological or cultural programming, unless such activities are incidental to an approved capital infrastructure project; or​
​
(3) programs whose primary purpose is short-term humanitarian relief, social service delivery, or ideological or cultural programming, except that the President may authorize temporary humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster, armed conflict, famine, epidemic, mass displacement, or other extraordinary humanitarian emergency, provided that such assistance—​

(i) is necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious threats to human health or safety;​
​
(ii) is limited to the minimum amount and duration reasonably necessary to address the emergency;​
​
(iii) is subject to appropriate oversight and anti-diversion measures; and​
​
(iv) shall not be construed to authorize permanent funding of recurrent social-service programs or general budget support.​
​
(4) any activity that does not have a clear, quantifiable link to sustained economic growth and expanded private-sector opportunity.​

(c) Project Selection Criteria.—The Secretary of State shall establish transparent criteria requiring that each funded project—

(1) undergoes independent economic-rate-of-return analysis demonstrating a positive net present value;​
​
(2) prioritizes private-sector participation, co-financing, or eventual ownership transfer where feasible; and​
​
(3) includes measurable performance indicators for job creation, private investment leveraged, and increases in trade or productivity.​

(d) Private-Sector Leverage.—For purposes of satisfying the requirements of this section, eligible assistance shall include—

(1) loan guarantees;​
​
(2) political-risk insurance;​
​
(3) equity or debt participation through authorised United States development finance institutions;​
​
(4) public-private partnerships;​
​
(5) blended-finance arrangements;​
​
(6) technical assistance directly tied to private investment or commercially viable infrastructure;​
​
(7) feasibility studies necessary to unlock private capital; and​
​
(8) other programs that leverage non-Federal investment at a ratio determined by the Secretary of State to provide substantial value to the United States taxpayer.​

(e) Priority For Leveraged Investment.—In selecting projects under this Act, preference shall be given to programs that—

(1) mobilise substantial private capital;​
​
(2) reduce long-term dependence on direct United States assistance;​
​
(3) create opportunities for United States businesses and exporters;​
​
(4) strengthen supply chains important to the United States or its allies; or​
​
(5) provide credible alternatives to financing offered by strategic competitors.​


SECTION 6. CONDITIONALITY ON DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS AND FREE-MARKET REFORMS.
(a) Certification Requirement.—No ODA funds may be obligated or expended for a country in any fiscal year unless the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the government of that country—

(1) is making demonstrable progress toward meeting democratic standards; and​
​
(2) is implementing, or has a credible, time-bound plan to implement, free-market reforms.​

(a) Certification Requirement.—

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no ODA funds may be obligated or expended for a country in any fiscal year unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government of that country—​
​
(A) is meeting democratic standards; or​
​
(B) is making demonstrable progress toward such standards; and​
​
(C) is implementing, or has a credible and time-bound plan to implement, reforms that improve property rights, contract enforcement, market access, fiscal transparency, or the environment for domestic and foreign investment.​
​
(2) In making a certification under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider—​
​
(A) the country’s current level of institutional development;​
​
(B) the direction and pace of reform;​
​
(C) whether continued engagement is likely to improve governance or market conditions;​
​
(D) the strategic importance of the country to the United States; and​
​
(E) the risk that immediate termination of assistance would increase the influence of a strategic competitor.​
​
(3) A country shall not be denied assistance solely because it has not yet achieved the same institutional standards as a developed democracy, provided that measurable progress is being made and assistance is reasonably likely to advance the purposes of this Act.​

(b) Suspension and Termination.—If the Secretary determines that a recipient country has backslid on democratic standards or free-market reforms, the Secretary shall immediately suspend further obligations and may terminate existing agreements.

(c) Exceptions.—The President may waive the requirements of this section for a period not to exceed 180 days with respect to a specific country if the President determines and reports to Congress that a waiver is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. Any such waiver shall be accompanied by a detailed justification and a plan to restore conditionality.


(d) Strategic Competition Waiver.—The President may waive the requirements of section 4, section 5(a), or section 6 with respect to a specific country or program for a period not to exceed 12 months if the President determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is necessary to—

(1) counter significant economic, political, technological, or security influence by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, or another strategic competitor of the United States;​
​
(2) prevent a strategically significant port, energy facility, telecommunications network, transportation corridor, mineral resource, or other critical infrastructure asset from falling under the control or substantial influence of a strategic competitor;​
​
(3) preserve access, basing, overflight, logistics, intelligence, or other strategic cooperation important to the national security of the United States; or​
​
(4) prevent a substantial deterioration in the strategic position of the United States or its allies.​

Any waiver under this subsection shall include—

(A) a description of the strategic interest involved;​
​
(B) the amount and duration of assistance;​
​
(C) measurable objectives for the assistance; and​
​
(D) a plan for terminating, reducing, or transitioning the assistance when the strategic need has passed.​


SECTION 7. REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT.
(a) Annual Report.—Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing—

(1) total ODA obligations and expenditures relative to the ceiling in section 4;​
​
(2) the percentage of funds directed to capital expenditure and eligible infrastructure;​
​
(3) the economic returns and private investment leveraged by funded projects;​
​
(4) certifications and any waivers issued under section 6; and​
​
(5) measurable outcomes related to democratic standards and free-market reforms in recipient countries.​

(b) Inspector General Review.—The Inspectors General of the Department of State and any successor to the United States Agency for International Development shall conduct annual audits of compliance with the prioritization and conditionality requirements of this Act.


SECTION 7A. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC RETURNS.
(a) In administering assistance under this Act, the Secretary of State shall, where consistent with United States law and international obligations, give preference to programs that—

(1) expand market access for United States goods and services;​
​
(2) facilitate investment by United States firms;​
​
(3) strengthen supply chains important to the United States;​
​
(4) support reliable access to critical minerals, energy, transportation, or digital infrastructure;​
​
(5) reduce dependence on financing, technology, or infrastructure controlled by strategic competitors; or​
​
(6) generate measurable economic benefits for the United States and recipient country.​

(b) The Secretary shall include in the annual report required under section 7 a description of—

(1) private investment leveraged;​
​
(2) United States exports supported;​
​
(3) contracts or commercial opportunities opened to United States firms;​
​
(4) strategic infrastructure protected from adversarial control; and​
​
(5) supply-chain or market-access gains resulting from assistance.​


SECTION 8. TRANSITION AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Existing multi-year commitments may continue only to the extent they are consistent with the prioritization and conditionality requirements of this Act; otherwise they shall be renegotiated or terminated.

(b) The Secretary of State shall revise all relevant regulations, strategies, and country development cooperation strategies within 180 days of enactment to conform to this Act.

(c) Any provision of law that authorizes ODA without the limitations and conditions established herein is hereby superseded to the extent of any inconsistency.



SECTION 9. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment and shall apply to funds appropriated for fiscal year 2026 and thereafter.







PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY
This bill establishes a hard funding ceiling at roughly half of recent average levels, mandates a strong shift toward productive capital and infrastructure investment, and imposes explicit democratic and free-market conditionality with limited national-security waivers and robust congressional oversight.

The amendment to Section 5(b)(3) ensures that the reduction and restructuring of foreign aid does not prevent the United States from responding to genuine humanitarian emergencies. While the bill would generally restrict funding for short-term humanitarian relief and ongoing social-service programs, the President would be allowed to provide temporary assistance following events such as natural disasters, wars, famines, epidemics, or mass displacement when that assistance is necessary to protect lives or prevent serious threats to health and safety. Any emergency assistance would have to be limited to what is reasonably necessary, subject to appropriate oversight and safeguards against


The amendments to replace Sections 4(a), 4(b), 5(a) and 6(a), and add in Sections 5(d), 5(e), 6(d) and 7A preserve the core reform goals of the FARPCA Act while ensuring foreign assistance remains usable as a critical tool of American grand strategy and foreign policy.

The amendments would:

  • allow temporary flexibility where U.S. assistance is needed to counter China, Russia, Iran or other strategic competitors;
  • reduce the rigid 70 percent infrastructure requirement and give the Secretary of State limited discretion where other programs would better advance U.S. interests;
  • explicitly protect development finance, loan guarantees, public-private partnerships, and other tools that leverage private capital;
  • make democracy and free-market conditions more flexible on a country-by-country basis, rewarding measurable reform rather than demanding identical standards everywhere;
  • turn the 50 percent aid ceiling into a temporary policy subject to congressional review rather than a permanent automatic cut; and
  • require development assistance to be judged partly by the commercial and strategic returns it delivers for the United States.
The principle is simple: cut waste, demand results, and reform foreign assistance while adding safeguards to ensure we do not hand China and Russia a strategic victory in the process.
 
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Madam President,

I rise today in opposition to the so-called Foreign Assistance Reform, Prioritization, and Conditionality Act.

Now, I support accountability in foreign aid. I support anti-corruption standards. I support making sure American dollars do not prop up dictators, warlords, or kleptocrats with Swiss bank accounts and press secretaries.

But this bill does not reform foreign assistance. It takes a meat cleaver to it.

This bill cuts official development assistance by roughly half. Then it forces at least 70 percent of what remains into capital expenditure and infrastructure projects. That means roads, ports, power, logistics, and private-sector investment get pushed to the front of the line while humanitarian relief, public health, food assistance, education, civil society, and basic social services get shoved to the side.

That dog won’t hunt.

Development is not just concrete. It is not just ports and power lines. It is medicine in a clinic. It is food after a drought. It is a girl staying in school. It is a free press that can expose corruption. It is labor rights, clean water, disaster relief, democratic organizing, climate resilience, and human dignity.

The bill says aid should be conditioned on democratic standards. Fine. But then it also conditions aid on free-market reforms, property rights, trade barriers, fiscal discipline, and private investment. Let’s be honest about what that means. It means Washington would tell struggling countries: adopt our preferred economic model or watch your people lose assistance.

That is not democracy support. That is ideological austerity with an American flag on the folder.

And who gets punished when a government backslides? Not the president in the palace. Not the general in the convoy. Not the oligarch with three houses and a lobbyist. It is the mother looking for medicine, the farmer facing drought, the child who needs food, and the local organizer trying to keep democracy alive under pressure.

I am all for building infrastructure. I am all for economic development. But foreign aid cannot become a private-sector infrastructure bank while humanitarian needs are treated like some inconvenient side quest.

America should be smart with foreign assistance. We should measure results. We should fight corruption. We should support democracy. But we should not abandon the people who need help most just because their suffering does not produce a neat return-on-investment spreadsheet.

This bill is too blunt, too ideological, and too harmful. I urge a no vote.
 
Mr. President,

I rise today in support of this bill. I am no opponent of helping foreign states and their people in times of hardship, but we must remember our own people face hardships and it is our duty to put the needs of the American taxpayer first. Families across America are dealing with high costs, struggling to make ends meet, and watching Washington spend billions abroad. We have a responsibility to ask whether every dollar is being spent wisely.

This is not some call for a return to isolationism -- support for this bill does not mean support for American turning its back on the world, but it is support to end the confusion between generosity and an unlimited obligation to fund foreign governments and programs.

In a time where every cent counts, we need to move away from the days of blank checks and perpetually paying governments to administer programs, American assistance should help create the conditions for private businesses, jobs, investment and economic growth. I have long argued that the financial support America sends should be focused on the things that will help set a country up to become economically independent.

This bill achieves those goals.

If Congress is going to as the American taxpayer to fund something, we should be able to explain what it accomplishes and whether it worked. Every foreign project should have measurable outcomes. This is the least we can do when spending the tax dollars of the American people.

Democracy. Rights. Freedom. These are three things that make our country the great nation that it is. I don't think it is unreasonable to ask that a country receiving American assistance to respect these values that are the very foundations of our own country. If these countries backslide, or refuse to govern responsibly, we should not expect American taxpayers to subsidize them.

There is one important distinction I believe this bill needs to make. Aid isn't always permanent programs, sometimes it is about helping people whose lives have been turned upside down by an extraordinary disaster. For example: an earthquake destroys a city; a war drives millions from their homes; or famine threatens innocent lives -- America should retain the ability to respond.

That is why I want to introduce an amendment to create a narrow, temporary humanitarian exception for genuine emergencies.

Now this isn't a blank check either. Assistance must be necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious threats to health and safety, limited to what is actually needed, and subject to oversight and safeguards against corruption and diversion. The amendment does not restore permanent funding for foreign social programs or general government budgets.

What this amendment does is show that we can be compassionate without being careless. We can help people in desperate circumstances. And we can do it without asking American taxpayers to finance an endless foreign-aid bureaucracy.

Putting Americans first doesn't mean America does nothing for anyone else. It means we get our own house in order, spend our money responsibly, and make sure that when America does help, that help actually matters. This bill makes foreign assistance smaller, smarter and more accountable. My amendment makes sure that in doing so, we don't lose our sense of responsibility. I urge my colleagues to support the bill and this amendment.

I yield.



VEGA I
Replace Section 5(b)(3) with the following:
(3) programs whose primary purpose is short-term humanitarian relief, social service delivery, or ideological or cultural programming, except that the President may authorize temporary humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster, armed conflict, famine, epidemic, mass displacement, or other extraordinary humanitarian emergency, provided that such assistance—


(i) is necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious threats to human health or safety;​
​
(ii) is limited to the minimum amount and duration reasonably necessary to address the emergency;​
​
(iii) is subject to appropriate oversight and anti-diversion measures; and​
​
(iv) shall not be construed to authorize permanent funding of recurrent social-service programs or general budget support;​
​
​
PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY
This amendment ensures that the reduction and restructuring of foreign aid does not prevent the United States from responding to genuine humanitarian emergencies. While the bill would generally restrict funding for short-term humanitarian relief and ongoing social-service programs, the President would be allowed to provide temporary assistance following events such as natural disasters, wars, famines, epidemics, or mass displacement when that assistance is necessary to protect lives or prevent serious threats to health and safety. Any emergency assistance would have to be limited to what is reasonably necessary, subject to appropriate oversight and safeguards against misuse, and could not be used to create permanent funding for foreign social programs or provide general financial support to foreign governments.
 
Mr. President,

I rise today in support of this bill. I am no opponent of helping foreign states and their people in times of hardship, but we must remember our own people face hardships and it is our duty to put the needs of the American taxpayer first. Families across America are dealing with high costs, struggling to make ends meet, and watching Washington spend billions abroad. We have a responsibility to ask whether every dollar is being spent wisely.

This is not some call for a return to isolationism -- support for this bill does not mean support for American turning its back on the world, but it is support to end the confusion between generosity and an unlimited obligation to fund foreign governments and programs.

In a time where every cent counts, we need to move away from the days of blank checks and perpetually paying governments to administer programs, American assistance should help create the conditions for private businesses, jobs, investment and economic growth. I have long argued that the financial support America sends should be focused on the things that will help set a country up to become economically independent.

This bill achieves those goals.

If Congress is going to as the American taxpayer to fund something, we should be able to explain what it accomplishes and whether it worked. Every foreign project should have measurable outcomes. This is the least we can do when spending the tax dollars of the American people.

Democracy. Rights. Freedom. These are three things that make our country the great nation that it is. I don't think it is unreasonable to ask that a country receiving American assistance to respect these values that are the very foundations of our own country. If these countries backslide, or refuse to govern responsibly, we should not expect American taxpayers to subsidize them.

There is one important distinction I believe this bill needs to make. Aid isn't always permanent programs, sometimes it is about helping people whose lives have been turned upside down by an extraordinary disaster. For example: an earthquake destroys a city; a war drives millions from their homes; or famine threatens innocent lives -- America should retain the ability to respond.

That is why I want to introduce an amendment to create a narrow, temporary humanitarian exception for genuine emergencies.

Now this isn't a blank check either. Assistance must be necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious threats to health and safety, limited to what is actually needed, and subject to oversight and safeguards against corruption and diversion. The amendment does not restore permanent funding for foreign social programs or general government budgets.

What this amendment does is show that we can be compassionate without being careless. We can help people in desperate circumstances. And we can do it without asking American taxpayers to finance an endless foreign-aid bureaucracy.

Putting Americans first doesn't mean America does nothing for anyone else. It means we get our own house in order, spend our money responsibly, and make sure that when America does help, that help actually matters. This bill makes foreign assistance smaller, smarter and more accountable. My amendment makes sure that in doing so, we don't lose our sense of responsibility. I urge my colleagues to support the bill and this amendment.

I yield.



VEGA I
Replace Section 5(b)(3) with the following:
(3) programs whose primary purpose is short-term humanitarian relief, social service delivery, or ideological or cultural programming, except that the President may authorize temporary humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster, armed conflict, famine, epidemic, mass displacement, or other extraordinary humanitarian emergency, provided that such assistance—


(i) is necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious threats to human health or safety;​
​
(ii) is limited to the minimum amount and duration reasonably necessary to address the emergency;​
​
(iii) is subject to appropriate oversight and anti-diversion measures; and​
​
(iv) shall not be construed to authorize permanent funding of recurrent social-service programs or general budget support;​
​
​
PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY
This amendment ensures that the reduction and restructuring of foreign aid does not prevent the United States from responding to genuine humanitarian emergencies. While the bill would generally restrict funding for short-term humanitarian relief and ongoing social-service programs, the President would be allowed to provide temporary assistance following events such as natural disasters, wars, famines, epidemics, or mass displacement when that assistance is necessary to protect lives or prevent serious threats to health and safety. Any emergency assistance would have to be limited to what is reasonably necessary, subject to appropriate oversight and safeguards against misuse, and could not be used to create permanent funding for foreign social programs or provide general financial support to foreign governments.

Mr. President,

I second the amendment and yield.
 
Mr. President,

I rise today because I support the central argument behind this bill. American foreign assistance should not be an entitlement for foreign governments, nor should it be a permanent subsidy for weak institutions, failed economic models or programs that continue year after year simply because Washington has always funded them. The American taxpayer deserves better than that. Senator Manning is right to insist on results and that our assistance should create conditions for growth, private investment, stronger institutions and ultimately less dependence on American assistance rather than more.

But we have another principle to keep in mind.

Foreign assistance is not merely charity. It is also an instrument of American power. And if we forget that, we risk saving a dollar in one column of the federal budget while surrendering something far more valuable somewhere else in the world.

Competition is underway today in ports, power grids, telecommunications networks, mineral supply chains, rail corridors and financial systems across the developing world. China understands that competition very well. Beijing does not finance a port because it woke up one morning feeling charitable. It finances infrastructure because infrastructure creates leverage, access, commercial relationships, political influence, and, over time, dependence.

Russia understands such influence too. So does Iran. America should understand it just as clearly.

That is why I am offering this package of amendments to this legislation.

The first creates a narrow strategic-competition waiver. If a critical port, energy project, telecommunications system, mineral asset or transportation corridor is at risk of falling under the influence of China or another adversary, the President and administration should have the ability to act. That authority would be temporary, transparent and subject to congressional reporting. But it would exist, because I do not believe fiscal conservatism requires strategic blindness.

The second amendment gives the Secretary of State more flexibility in how assistance is used. This bill is right to favour infrastructure, capital investment, and programs that create long-term economic value. But a rigid 70% rule risks substituting one Washington formula for another. Some countries will have a road or a power plant that is exactly what we should fund. Others will be better served by a loan guarantee, a feasibility study, a customs reform program, or technical assistance that unlocks billions in private investment. We ought to care about outcomes, not merely categories.

That is also why these amendments explicitly protect successful private-sector tools: loan guarantees, development finance, political-risk insurance, public-private partnerships and other programs that can turn one American dollar into several dollars of private investment. Why? Because we should be helping countries become places where American companies can invest, where contracts are enforced, where private property is protected, and where businesses can compete without having to bribe a minister or surrender themselves to a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

My amendments also improve the bill’s conditionality provisions. I agree completely that American taxpayers should not subsidise governments that reject democracy, abuse their people, or destroy any chance of a functioning market economy. However, foreign policy is conducted in the world as it exists, not in the world as we wish it existed. Some countries are imperfect democracies. Some are moving in the right direction from a very low starting point. Some are strategically important partners whose institutions still need work. We should judge progress honestly, country by country, and ask whether American engagement makes reform more or less likely. If cutting off assistance simply drives a strategically important country directly into Beijing’s arms, we should at least have the intelligence to consider that consequence before we congratulate ourselves.

And finally, these amendments change the funding ceiling from permanent austerity into a policy that Congress must review.

In summary, I am prepared to cut foreign assistance that is wasteful, unfocused or ineffective. But Congress should not lock America permanently into retreat and pretend we know today what tomorrow’s strategic competition will demand.

The test should be simple: does our assistance make America safer, strengthen our influence, open markets, support American enterprise and reduce the leverage of China and Russia? If it does not, cut it. If it does, do not throw away a useful instrument of American power simply to boast about the size of the savings.

There is nothing conservative about saving a dollar today only to spend ten recovering influence from Beijing tomorrow. These amendments cut waste, demand results and reward markets while preserving America’s ability to compete.

Reform foreign assistance. Do not retreat from the world.

I urge my colleagues to support these amendments.

I yield.

++

ROWAN AMENDMENT PACKAGE TO S.18​

ROWAN I — STRATEGIC COMPETITION WAIVER​

Insert after Section 6(c):

**(d) STRATEGIC COMPETITION WAIVER.—**The President may waive the requirements of section 4, section 5(a), or section 6 with respect to a specific country or program for a period not to exceed 12 months if the President determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is necessary to—

(1) counter significant economic, political, technological, or security influence by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, or another strategic competitor of the United States;

(2) prevent a strategically significant port, energy facility, telecommunications network, transportation corridor, mineral resource, or other critical infrastructure asset from falling under the control or substantial influence of a strategic competitor;

(3) preserve access, basing, overflight, logistics, intelligence, or other strategic cooperation important to the national security of the United States; or

(4) prevent a substantial deterioration in the strategic position of the United States or its allies.

Any waiver under this subsection shall include—

(A) a description of the strategic interest involved;

(B) the amount and duration of assistance;

(C) measurable objectives for the assistance; and

(D) a plan for terminating, reducing, or transitioning the assistance when the strategic need has passed.


ROWAN II — FLEXIBILITY IN CAPITAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE ALLOCATION​

Replace Section 5(a) with the following:

(a) PRIMARY PURPOSE.—

(1) Not less than 60 percent of all ODA funds made available under this Act shall be obligated for capital expenditure, eligible infrastructure, private-sector development, or other activities that demonstrably expand economic productivity, trade, investment, energy security, or employment.

(2) The Secretary of State may reduce the requirement under paragraph (1) for a specific country or program to not less than 40 percent if the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) strict compliance would materially impair an important national security or strategic objective of the United States;

(B) alternative assistance is likely to produce greater measurable economic, governance, or security returns; and

(C) the assistance remains consistent with the purposes of this Act.

(3) Any use of authority under paragraph (2) shall be accompanied by a written justification and measurable performance objectives.


ROWAN III — PRIVATE CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE PROTECTION​

Insert after Section 5(c):

**(d) PRIVATE-SECTOR LEVERAGE.—**For purposes of satisfying the requirements of this section, eligible assistance shall include—

(1) loan guarantees;

(2) political-risk insurance;

(3) equity or debt participation through authorised United States development finance institutions;

(4) public-private partnerships;

(5) blended-finance arrangements;

(6) technical assistance directly tied to private investment or commercially viable infrastructure;

(7) feasibility studies necessary to unlock private capital; and

(8) other programs that leverage non-Federal investment at a ratio determined by the Secretary of State to provide substantial value to the United States taxpayer.

**(e) PRIORITY FOR LEVERAGED INVESTMENT.—**In selecting projects under this Act, preference shall be given to programs that—

(1) mobilise substantial private capital;

(2) reduce long-term dependence on direct United States assistance;

(3) create opportunities for United States businesses and exporters;

(4) strengthen supply chains important to the United States or its allies; or

(5) provide credible alternatives to financing offered by strategic competitors.


ROWAN IV — COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY CONDITIONALITY​

Replace Section 6(a) with the following:

(a) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no ODA funds may be obligated or expended for a country in any fiscal year unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government of that country—

(A) is meeting democratic standards; or

(B) is making demonstrable progress toward such standards; and

(C) is implementing, or has a credible and time-bound plan to implement, reforms that improve property rights, contract enforcement, market access, fiscal transparency, or the environment for domestic and foreign investment.

(2) In making a certification under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider—

(A) the country’s current level of institutional development;

(B) the direction and pace of reform;

(C) whether continued engagement is likely to improve governance or market conditions;

(D) the strategic importance of the country to the United States; and

(E) the risk that immediate termination of assistance would increase the influence of a strategic competitor.

(3) A country shall not be denied assistance solely because it has not yet achieved the same institutional standards as a developed democracy, provided that measurable progress is being made and assistance is reasonably likely to advance the purposes of this Act.


ROWAN V — PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE FUNDING CEILING​

Replace Section 4(a) and (b) with the following:

**(a) INITIAL FUNDING CEILING.—**For fiscal years 2026 through 2029, total new budget authority for ODA shall not exceed 50 percent of the average annual ODA volume provided by the United States in calendar years 2022 through 2024, adjusted annually for inflation.

**(b) QUADRENNIAL REVIEW.—**Not later than March 1, 2029, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to Congress a review evaluating—

(1) savings achieved under the funding ceiling;

(2) changes in program effectiveness;

(3) changes in private capital leveraged;

(4) the effect on United States influence relative to strategic competitors;

(5) the effect on access to critical infrastructure, strategic minerals, trade corridors, and emerging markets;

(6) the effect on humanitarian response capacity; and

(7) whether continuation, modification, or expiration of the funding ceiling best serves the national interest.

**(c) REAUTHORIZATION.—**The funding ceiling established under subsection (a) shall expire at the end of fiscal year 2029 unless Congress expressly reauthorises or modifies it by law.

**(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—**Nothing in this section shall prevent Congress from appropriating additional funds in response to war, humanitarian emergency, national security contingency, or strategic competition where expressly authorized by law.


ROWAN VI — AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND MARKET ACCESS​

Insert after Section 7:

SECTION 7A. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC RETURNS.

(a) In administering assistance under this Act, the Secretary of State shall, where consistent with United States law and international obligations, give preference to programs that—

(1) expand market access for United States goods and services;

(2) facilitate investment by United States firms;

(3) strengthen supply chains important to the United States;

(4) support reliable access to critical minerals, energy, transportation, or digital infrastructure;

(5) reduce dependence on financing, technology, or infrastructure controlled by strategic competitors; or

(6) generate measurable economic benefits for the United States and recipient country.

(b) The Secretary shall include in the annual report required under section 7 a description of—

(1) private investment leveraged;

(2) United States exports supported;

(3) contracts or commercial opportunities opened to United States firms;

(4) strategic infrastructure protected from adversarial control; and

(5) supply-chain or market-access gains resulting from assistance.


Plain English Summary​

The Rowan amendments preserve the core reform goals of the FARPCA Act while ensuring foreign assistance remains usable as a critical tool of American grand strategy and foreign policy.

The amendments would:

  • allow temporary flexibility where U.S. assistance is needed to counter China, Russia, Iran or other strategic competitors;
  • reduce the rigid 70 percent infrastructure requirement and give the Secretary of State limited discretion where other programs would better advance U.S. interests;
  • explicitly protect development finance, loan guarantees, public-private partnerships, and other tools that leverage private capital;
  • make democracy and free-market conditions more flexible on a country-by-country basis, rewarding measurable reform rather than demanding identical standards everywhere;
  • turn the 50 percent aid ceiling into a temporary policy subject to congressional review rather than a permanent automatic cut; and
  • require development assistance to be judged partly by the commercial and strategic returns it delivers for the United States.
The principle is simple: cut waste, demand results, and reform foreign assistance while adding safeguards to ensure we do not hand China and Russia a strategic victory in the process.
 
Mr. President,

I rise today because I support the central argument behind this bill. American foreign assistance should not be an entitlement for foreign governments, nor should it be a permanent subsidy for weak institutions, failed economic models or programs that continue year after year simply because Washington has always funded them. The American taxpayer deserves better than that. Senator Manning is right to insist on results and that our assistance should create conditions for growth, private investment, stronger institutions and ultimately less dependence on American assistance rather than more.

But we have another principle to keep in mind.

Foreign assistance is not merely charity. It is also an instrument of American power. And if we forget that, we risk saving a dollar in one column of the federal budget while surrendering something far more valuable somewhere else in the world.

Competition is underway today in ports, power grids, telecommunications networks, mineral supply chains, rail corridors and financial systems across the developing world. China understands that competition very well. Beijing does not finance a port because it woke up one morning feeling charitable. It finances infrastructure because infrastructure creates leverage, access, commercial relationships, political influence, and, over time, dependence.

Russia understands such influence too. So does Iran. America should understand it just as clearly.

That is why I am offering this package of amendments to this legislation.

The first creates a narrow strategic-competition waiver. If a critical port, energy project, telecommunications system, mineral asset or transportation corridor is at risk of falling under the influence of China or another adversary, the President and administration should have the ability to act. That authority would be temporary, transparent and subject to congressional reporting. But it would exist, because I do not believe fiscal conservatism requires strategic blindness.

The second amendment gives the Secretary of State more flexibility in how assistance is used. This bill is right to favour infrastructure, capital investment, and programs that create long-term economic value. But a rigid 70% rule risks substituting one Washington formula for another. Some countries will have a road or a power plant that is exactly what we should fund. Others will be better served by a loan guarantee, a feasibility study, a customs reform program, or technical assistance that unlocks billions in private investment. We ought to care about outcomes, not merely categories.

That is also why these amendments explicitly protect successful private-sector tools: loan guarantees, development finance, political-risk insurance, public-private partnerships and other programs that can turn one American dollar into several dollars of private investment. Why? Because we should be helping countries become places where American companies can invest, where contracts are enforced, where private property is protected, and where businesses can compete without having to bribe a minister or surrender themselves to a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

My amendments also improve the bill’s conditionality provisions. I agree completely that American taxpayers should not subsidise governments that reject democracy, abuse their people, or destroy any chance of a functioning market economy. However, foreign policy is conducted in the world as it exists, not in the world as we wish it existed. Some countries are imperfect democracies. Some are moving in the right direction from a very low starting point. Some are strategically important partners whose institutions still need work. We should judge progress honestly, country by country, and ask whether American engagement makes reform more or less likely. If cutting off assistance simply drives a strategically important country directly into Beijing’s arms, we should at least have the intelligence to consider that consequence before we congratulate ourselves.

And finally, these amendments change the funding ceiling from permanent austerity into a policy that Congress must review.

In summary, I am prepared to cut foreign assistance that is wasteful, unfocused or ineffective. But Congress should not lock America permanently into retreat and pretend we know today what tomorrow’s strategic competition will demand.

The test should be simple: does our assistance make America safer, strengthen our influence, open markets, support American enterprise and reduce the leverage of China and Russia? If it does not, cut it. If it does, do not throw away a useful instrument of American power simply to boast about the size of the savings.

There is nothing conservative about saving a dollar today only to spend ten recovering influence from Beijing tomorrow. These amendments cut waste, demand results and reward markets while preserving America’s ability to compete.

Reform foreign assistance. Do not retreat from the world.

I urge my colleagues to support these amendments.

I yield.

++
Mr. President,

I second these amendments and yield.
 
VEGA I passes 100-0.
ROWAN I passes 51-0.
ROWAN II passes 100-0.
ROWAN III passes 51-0.
ROWAN IV passes 100-0.
ROWAN V passes 100-0.
ROWAN VI passes 51-0.

The original bill text has been updated. Debate continues.
 
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