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HEARING: Sri Srinivasan to the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Withdrawn from floor. Debate and pending votes have ended.

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The Senate will come to order.

Pursuant to the direction of the Senate Majority Leader, a nomination hearing is now open on NOMINATION: Sri Srinivasan to the Supreme Court of the United States..

The nomination remains before the Senate for hearing and debate until cloture is invoked.

Members may question the nominee, debate the nomination and offer procedural motions in accordance with the Senate Rules. There are allotted 96 hours for a hearing, followed by debate, which will require cloture to close off.

Original legislation

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I nominate Srikanth Srinivasan, of Maryland, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, vice Antonin Scalia.

BARACK OBAMA

Leadership may invoke cloture and open a confirmation vote. The confirmation vote lasts 48 hours and is decided using a human tally.
 
Opening Statement of Sri Srinivasan
Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Before the Senate


Mr. Majority Leader, Mr. Minority Leader, Members of the Senate:

Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. I am grateful to the President for the confidence he has placed in me, and to the Members of this Committee for the care you have already devoted to this nomination.

I would be remiss to begin anywhere other than with the man whose seat I have been asked to fill. Justice Antonin Scalia served this country on its highest court for nearly three decades. Whatever one’s view of any single opinion he wrote, no one can doubt the seriousness of purpose he brought to the work, the force and clarity of his pen, or the depth of his devotion to the Constitution and to the craft of judging. He changed the way a generation of lawyers reads a statute and reads the Constitution’s text, and he did so out of a conviction that the words on the page are not incidental — they are the law. I did not always agree with him. But I learned from him, as every lawyer of my generation did, and I am keenly aware of the responsibility that comes with being considered for the chair he held. The Court, and the country, are poorer for his absence.

If I may, I would like to say a few words about how I came to be before you.

I was born in Chandigarh, India. My family came to this country when I was four years old and settled in Lawrence, Kansas, where my father taught mathematics at the University of Kansas and my mother taught as well. My two sisters and I were raised in the public schools of Lawrence, and I became — and remain — a loyal, if sometimes long-suffering, Kansas basketball fan.

Mine is an American story, and I am conscious that it is not one that would have been possible in every place or in every time. My parents arrived here with very little, trusting that this was a country where the law would treat their children no differently than anyone else’s. That trust — in a government of laws, applied equally and without favor — is, to my mind, the very thing the judicial branch exists to protect.

I was fortunate in my education and in my teachers. After earning my degrees at Stanford, I had the honor of clerking for Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III on the Fourth Circuit, and then for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. From Justice O’Connor I learned that judging is not the work of ideology; it is the patient, case-by-case application of law to fact, undertaken with an open mind and a decent humility about the limits of one’s own judgment.

In the years since, I have practiced law in both the private and the public sector. I spent many years as an appellate lawyer, and I was privileged to serve in the Office of the Solicitor General under administrations of both parties — first as an Assistant to the Solicitor General, and later as Principal Deputy Solicitor General. In those roles I represented the United States before the Supreme Court, and over the course of my career I have argued some two dozen cases before that Court, on behalf of clients as varied as the government itself, criminal defendants, and private businesses. For the past two years, I have had the honor of serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

If I am confirmed, I will bring no agenda to the bench but the one the Constitution assigns: to decide the cases that come before me fairly, according to the law and the facts, without regard to the identity of the parties or the popularity of the result. A judge is not a legislator. A judge does not choose a winner and then reason backward to justify it. The role is a modest one, and I have come to believe that its modesty is the source of its legitimacy. The day the public comes to see judges as politicians in robes is the day the courts forfeit the only authority they truly possess — the confidence of the people they serve.

I am grateful to my family, who are with me today, for their patience and their support, and to the many friends and colleagues who made this day possible. I thank the Committee again for its consideration, and I look forward to your questions.

(Statement fictional and used for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan for the nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court)
 
Judge Srinivasan, thank you for joining us here today. I welcome you and your family here to this hearing. Before we go further, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge your remarkable personal story. Regardless of the questioning, answers, and ultimate outcome of this hearing, no one can deny that your path to the bench is one in which we can find many of the best qualities of what it means to be an American.

I want to begin with three questions that I'm sure you've been asked at the hundreds of seminars and lectures you have given. First, how would you describe your judicial philosophy? What do you see as the proper role of a Supreme Court justice in our constitutional system? What do you see as the parameters or guidelines by which a Supreme Court justice would need to recuse him or herself from ruling on a case? And how do you approach a statute when the text is ambiguous?
 
Judge Srinivasan, thank you for being here.


I’ve said from the beginning that a hearing is not a promise of confirmation. It is a chance for senators to ask questions, examine the record, and make an informed judgment. That is what I intend to do today.


You have served under presidents of both parties, argued before the Supreme Court, and sat on the D.C. Circuit. You have also represented clients and taken positions as an advocate that some senators have raised questions about. I want to understand how you think, how you separate advocacy from judgment, and what principles would guide you if confirmed to the Supreme Court.


I am not looking for campaign slogans or promises about future cases. I am looking for how you approach the Constitution, precedent, individual rights, and the limits of government power.

What do you believe is the proper role of the Supreme Court when a President claims broad authority in the name of national security or executive necessity? Where should courts draw the line between legitimate executive discretion and unconstitutional overreach?

How should the Court balance national-security concerns against the privacy rights of ordinary Americans, particularly when surveillance programs collect information from people who are not suspected of any crime?

Do you view the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right, and how should courts evaluate regulations that claim to protect public safety without effectively eliminating that right?

When a State adopts election rules in the name of preventing fraud, but those rules also make it harder for eligible citizens to vote, what principles should courts use to determine whether the burden has gone too far?

How should courts approach mandatory arbitration agreements when workers or consumers have little real bargaining power and may be giving up their ability to bring claims in court?

What weight should the Court give to precedent when a Justice believes a prior decision may have been wrongly decided? When does respect for stability outweigh the argument for correcting an old mistake?

You represented Jeff Skilling, and some of my colleagues have raised that as a concern. Can you explain the distinction between arguments you made as an advocate for a client and the legal principles you would apply as a judge?

Do you believe representing an unpopular or even deeply unsympathetic client should be treated as evidence of a lawyer’s personal beliefs? And what obligation does the legal profession have to ensure that even unpopular defendants receive effective representation?

What does judicial restraint mean to you in practice? How do you distinguish between interpreting the law and effectively rewriting it from the bench?

You have served in both Republican and Democratic administrations. What would you say to Americans who worry that Supreme Court Justices simply become extensions of the party or President who appointed them?

Thank you, Judge. I may agree or disagree with some of your answers, but this is exactly why the hearing mattered. Senators should hear the nominee, ask the difficult questions, and make their judgment from the record. That is the process I wanted, and that is the process I intend to respect.
 
Judge Srinivasan. Thank you for your time today.

1) You've argued two dozen cases before the Supreme Court, and some of your clients were criminal defendants. Back home, the people I watched get run over by a system were the ones with nobody at the table beside them. When you stood up for someone with the whole weight of the United States on the other side, what did that teach you about what a fair hearing is supposed to mean?

2) Senator Bailey has raised your work for Mr. Skilling, and I won't pretend that's an easy name to say in a room with folks who lost their retirements. I was a hospital CEO. I've sat across from people whose security disappeared overnight. So I'll ask you plainly: why does a lawyer take a client like that, what did you actually argue, and what do you say to those families?

3) Senator Bailey says you argued against working people five years ago or less, and that your kind of resume comes a dime a dozen. I'd rather hear it from you than from a Sunday show. Tell us about that case. Then tell us about a time on the D.C. Circuit when the law pointed to a result you personally didn't like, and what you did about it.

4) Judge, your parents trusted that the law would treat their kids like anyone else's. I'm not asking you about any bill pending before us. I'm asking about the principle. A farm family or a rural hospital that wants to be heard in court shouldn't have to put up money first to prove they're worth hearing. Is open access to a courtroom part of equal justice under law, and does it matter whether you can afford a lawyer?

5) You told us that Justice Scalia changed how a generation reads a statute, and that you learned from him even when you disagreed. Two years ago this body confirmed you 97 to 0. Is there anything about you, your record, or how you'd decide cases that's different today than the day every Senator in this room voted for you? If so, I'd like to hear it. If not, I'd like my colleagues to hear that too.
 
First off, Thank You, Mr. Srinivasan for being here today, and answering our questions.

As Senator Torgerson alluded to a moment ago, my colleagues and I will have some questions in a moment for you about your time in the private sector. But before we get into that, I actually was curious to get your feedback on your time working for the DOJ.

1. You served as Assistant to the Solicitor General for the Department of Justice from 2002 to 2007. Is it also correct to say that one of your primary responsibilities was writing and editing petitions for a writ of certiorari, briefs on the merits, responses, and other legal papers? In your time as Assistant to the Solicitor General, did you at all times do your best to exercise soberminded and balanced judgement in your responsibilities? And how did your experience working as Assistant to the Solicitor General prepare you for being a Supreme Court justice?

2. I am also keenly interested in your second stint at DOJ. This time as Principal Deputy Solicitor General of the United States for this current administration. You were a part of the team that argued against the Defense of Marriage Act in the case of United States v. Windsor. Given the Obergefell decision and the subsequent debate concerning the extent of religious liberty in the United States, do you believe it is a violation of the first amendment for a state deny public servants the opportunity to recuse themselves from situations or actions that violate their conscience?
 
Judge Srinivasan, thank you for joining us here today. I welcome you and your family here to this hearing. Before we go further, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge your remarkable personal story. Regardless of the questioning, answers, and ultimate outcome of this hearing, no one can deny that your path to the bench is one in which we can find many of the best qualities of what it means to be an American.

I want to begin with three questions that I'm sure you've been asked at the hundreds of seminars and lectures you have given. First, how would you describe your judicial philosophy? What do you see as the proper role of a Supreme Court justice in our constitutional system? What do you see as the parameters or guidelines by which a Supreme Court justice would need to recuse him or herself from ruling on a case? And how do you approach a statute when the text is ambiguous?
Senator, thank you — both for the welcome you have extended to my family and for the generous words about how I came to be here. I am mindful that the story you describe was written far more by my parents than by me, and I am grateful you would begin there. Let me take your questions in the order you asked them.

On judicial philosophy. I confess I have always been a little wary of the phrase, because it can suggest that a judge arrives at a case already knowing where he wishes to end up. If I have a philosophy, it is one of modesty. It begins from a simple fact: a judge is not an elected official, and that ought to make him cautious rather than bold. My task would be to decide the dispute actually before me, on the narrowest ground that resolves it, with fidelity to the text that governs — whether a statute or the Constitution — and with respect for the decisions of those who sat before me. I try to keep an open mind until the briefing and argument are complete, and to be honest with myself about the point at which my own preferences end and the law’s command begins. Those two are not always the same, and the whole discipline of judging lies in telling them apart.

On the proper role of a Justice. The Court’s authority, as Chief Justice Marshall described it, is to say what the law is — not what it ought to be. A Justice decides cases and controversies; he does not issue pronouncements on the questions of the day, however pressing they may seem. The hardest part of the role, to my mind, is restraint. The Constitution commits most of the great choices of our national life to the people and their elected representatives, and a Justice must resist the temptation to substitute his judgment for theirs simply because a given case gives him the power to do it. Where the Constitution or a statute speaks, the Court must enforce it without flinching, even when the result is unpopular. Where it does not speak, the Court should be slow to supply an answer the democratic branches have not. Both halves of that matter; a Justice who honors only one of them is not doing the job.

On recusal. The standard is not a matter of personal preference or convenience — it is set by statute, in 28 U.S.C. § 455, and by the Code of Conduct. A judge must step aside where he holds a financial interest in the outcome, where a close family member is involved, where he served as a lawyer in the very matter, and, more broadly, in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Having spent years in the Solicitor General’s office, I would expect to recuse from the cases I personally worked on there, and in a genuinely close call I would err toward stepping aside. But I would offer one caution running the other way: recusal is not costless. On a Court of nine there is no one to fill a recused Justice’s seat, and a reflexive willingness to withdraw can leave the Court unable to resolve questions the country needs resolved. So the duty runs in both directions — to sit when one properly can, and to withdraw without hesitation when the standard is met.

On reading an ambiguous statute. I would start where Justice Scalia taught a generation of us to start — with the words. Most questions are answered by reading the provision carefully, in the ordinary meaning its terms carried when they were enacted, and in the context of the whole statute: its structure, its neighboring provisions, the way the parts fit together. Genuine ambiguity is rarer than it is asserted to be. But when a text truly does not resolve the matter, I do not think a judge should pretend otherwise, or simply choose. I would turn to the traditional tools — the settled canons of construction, the evident purpose and design of the statute, and, where it is reliable, the record of its enactment. And some ambiguities are governed by rules we agree upon in advance: the presumption that Congress does not lightly intend to raise serious constitutional doubts, for example, or the rule of lenity in the criminal law. The aim throughout is the same — to find the meaning Congress enacted, not the one the judge might have preferred it to enact.

I am glad to go further on any of these, Senator, and I thank you again for where you chose to begin.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Judge Srinivasan, thank you for being here.


I’ve said from the beginning that a hearing is not a promise of confirmation. It is a chance for senators to ask questions, examine the record, and make an informed judgment. That is what I intend to do today.


You have served under presidents of both parties, argued before the Supreme Court, and sat on the D.C. Circuit. You have also represented clients and taken positions as an advocate that some senators have raised questions about. I want to understand how you think, how you separate advocacy from judgment, and what principles would guide you if confirmed to the Supreme Court.


I am not looking for campaign slogans or promises about future cases. I am looking for how you approach the Constitution, precedent, individual rights, and the limits of government power.





















Thank you, Judge. I may agree or disagree with some of your answers, but this is exactly why the hearing mattered. Senators should hear the nominee, ask the difficult questions, and make their judgment from the record. That is the process I wanted, and that is the process I intend to respect.
Please limit it to 2-3 questions.
 
Judge Srinivasan. Thank you for your time today.

1) You've argued two dozen cases before the Supreme Court, and some of your clients were criminal defendants. Back home, the people I watched get run over by a system were the ones with nobody at the table beside them. When you stood up for someone with the whole weight of the United States on the other side, what did that teach you about what a fair hearing is supposed to mean?

2) Senator Bailey has raised your work for Mr. Skilling, and I won't pretend that's an easy name to say in a room with folks who lost their retirements. I was a hospital CEO. I've sat across from people whose security disappeared overnight. So I'll ask you plainly: why does a lawyer take a client like that, what did you actually argue, and what do you say to those families?

3) Senator Bailey says you argued against working people five years ago or less, and that your kind of resume comes a dime a dozen. I'd rather hear it from you than from a Sunday show. Tell us about that case. Then tell us about a time on the D.C. Circuit when the law pointed to a result you personally didn't like, and what you did about it.

4) Judge, your parents trusted that the law would treat their kids like anyone else's. I'm not asking you about any bill pending before us. I'm asking about the principle. A farm family or a rural hospital that wants to be heard in court shouldn't have to put up money first to prove they're worth hearing. Is open access to a courtroom part of equal justice under law, and does it matter whether you can afford a lawyer?

5) You told us that Justice Scalia changed how a generation reads a statute, and that you learned from him even when you disagreed. Two years ago this body confirmed you 97 to 0. Is there anything about you, your record, or how you'd decide cases that's different today than the day every Senator in this room voted for you? If so, I'd like to hear it. If not, I'd like my colleagues to hear that too.
Senator, thank you. You’ve asked the kind of questions a witness hopes for — the ones that go to why any of this matters — and I’ll try to answer them as plainly as you put them.

On what standing opposite the United States taught me. More than I can fully say in the time I have. When you represent a person and the whole weight of the government is arrayed on the other side — its resources, its investigators, its presumption of being in the right — you learn very quickly that the only thing standing between your client and that weight is the process itself: the burden of proof, the rules of evidence, the right to be heard by someone who hasn’t already made up his mind. A fair hearing is not a courtesy we extend to the people we happen to find sympathetic. It is the promise that the outcome will turn on the law and the facts, and not on who the parties are or how much power sits behind one of them. I represented people the public had already judged. What that taught me is that the guarantees in the Constitution are worth exactly as much as they are worth to the least popular person who invokes them — and not a dollar more. A judge who remembers that is a judge worth having.

On Mr. Skilling. Senator, I understand why the name lands the way it does, and I won’t minimize what Enron’s collapse did to the people who trusted it with their futures. So let me be as direct as you were. I was not asked, and I did not argue, that Mr. Skilling was a good man or that no wrong had been done. The questions I put to the Supreme Court were narrower, and I’d suggest more important, than any one man: whether a federal fraud statute so vaguely written that courts themselves couldn’t agree on its limits could be used to put a person in prison, and whether a defendant can get a fair trial in a community where feeling against him runs so high that seating an impartial jury becomes a real question. The Court agreed that the statute had been stretched past what its words could carry, and it narrowed that law — a ruling that protects every person a prosecutor might reach with it, the overwhelming majority of whom will never be wealthy or famous. That is what lawyers in our system do: we test the government’s power at its hardest edge, on behalf of the client in front of us, precisely because the principle being tested does not belong to that client alone. To the families I’d say what I believe — that holding the government to the limits of its own statutes is not a favor to the guilty. It is the only thing that keeps those limits meaningful for the innocent.

On the charge that I argued against working people, and on a result I did not relish. I’d be glad to discuss any matter in my record, and if you’ll tell me which case Senator Bailey has in mind, I’ll address it on its facts rather than from a characterization I haven’t seen. What I can tell you generally is this: an advocate’s brief is the client’s position, not the lawyer’s politics. I’ve represented the United States, criminal defendants, and businesses, and over a career the client on your side one year is on the other side the next. The positions were theirs; the craft was mine. As for a result I didn’t like — Senator, it would be a poor judge who’d never had one. There have been cases where the governing precedent, or the plain terms of a statute, pointed somewhere I’d not have gone had I been writing the law instead of applying it, and in those cases I followed the law and said so on the page. The oath I took contains no exception for the days when the law and my sympathies part company. I would rather be the judge who tells you honestly that his hands were tied than the one who pretends they were free.

On access to the courthouse. Senator, the words carved above the entrance to the Supreme Court are “Equal Justice Under Law,” and I take them to mean what they say. A right you cannot afford to assert is not much of a right. The promise of our courts is that the farm family and the rural hospital you describe can stand before a judge on the same footing as the largest party in the room — that the law hears them because they are parties, not because they are solvent. In the criminal context the Court made part of that promise concrete long ago, when it held that a person facing the loss of his liberty must have a lawyer whether or not he can pay for one. I won’t pretend from this chair that every barrier has fallen, or that a judge alone can bring them down — much of that work belongs to this body and to the states. But the principle you’re asking about is not in doubt in my mind. Justice that depends on the size of a bank account is not equal, and it is not justice.

On whether I have changed since 97 to 0. No, Senator — and I’d ask my colleagues to hear that as plainly as I mean it. I am the same lawyer this body confirmed two years ago, with the same way of deciding cases: start with the text, decide the dispute in front of me and not the one I wish were there, follow the law where it leads, and keep an open mind until I’ve heard both sides. What’s different is not me. It is the seat. On the court where I sit now, a panel of my colleagues or the Supreme Court above us can correct me when I’m wrong. On the Court to which I’ve been nominated, there is no one above to catch the error. That doesn’t change my method, but it does sharpen the humility I bring to it. If anything about me is different today, it’s that I am more conscious than ever of how much a Justice ought to doubt himself before he lets himself be certain.

Thank you, Senator. These were not easy questions, and they were the right ones to ask.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Senator, thank you — I’m glad to speak about the time I spent in the Solicitor General’s office, which was among the most formative of my career, and I’ll do my best with your second question as well.

On my work as an Assistant to the Solicitor General. Yes, Senator, your description is accurate. From 2002 to 2007 I served in that office under Solicitor General Olson and those who followed him, and the work was very much as you set it out — preparing and editing petitions for certiorari, briefs on the merits, responses and oppositions, and the many other papers the United States files in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.

You ask whether I exercised soberminded and balanced judgment, and the honest answer is that the office itself permits nothing less. The Solicitor General’s office is sometimes called the Tenth Justice, and the nickname captures something real. The office owes the Court a duty of candor beyond that of an ordinary advocate. It confesses error when the government has won something it should have lost. It declines to press every argument that might prevail, because its credibility with the Court is an asset that belongs to the United States across administrations and not to any one of them. I served there under a Republican administration and returned later under a Democratic one, and the discipline was the same in both: to take positions the office could defend as a matter of law, soberly and consistently, rather than positions that merely suited whoever held the White House.


As for how it prepared me, I’m not sure there is a better apprenticeship for this work. I spent years reading the Court’s decisions closely enough to build arguments from them, watching how the Justices reasoned, learning which arguments earn a court’s trust and which squander it. I came to understand how a case travels to the Court and why the Court takes the few that it does. And I learned restraint — that the strongest brief is usually the narrowest one, and that a lawyer, like a judge, is most persuasive when he concedes what honesty requires him to concede. Those are habits I would carry to the bench.

On United States v. Windsor, and your question about conscience. Let me take the two pieces separately, Senator, because they differ in kind.

On the first: yes, I was Principal Deputy Solicitor General while that case was before the Court, and the office advanced the position that the relevant section of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. I’d offer the same distinction here that I’ve drawn for your colleagues — the position was the government’s, taken in the role of advocate, and the role of a judge is a different one. An advocate argues a client’s cause; a judge takes the cases as they come and decides them on the law and the record in front of him, whatever he may have argued in a prior life at the bar.

On your second question — whether the First Amendment is violated when a State declines to let a public servant step aside from duties that conflict with his conscience — I have to be careful, and I hope you’ll understand why. That precise question, in the wake of Obergefell, is the subject of active litigation in the lower courts at this very moment, and it is likely to reach the Supreme Court in one form or another. It would be wrong of me to tell this body how I would vote on a matter I may soon have to decide on a real record, with real parties and full briefing. That restraint is not evasion; it is the same restraint I would want from any nominee who might shortly sit in judgment on my own rights.

What I can do is describe the terrain honestly. The free exercise of religion is a bedrock guarantee, and the concern you raise — for the public servant who feels his faith and his office have been set at odds — is a serious one that deserves to be treated seriously. At the same time, a court would have to weigh competing interests: the State’s obligation to deliver government services evenhandedly to every citizen entitled to them, and the rights of the people standing on the other side of that counter. And I’d point to a distinction that often gets lost in the heat of this debate — the difference between whether the Constitution compels a State to grant such an accommodation, which is the hard question the courts are now wrestling with, and whether a State may choose to offer one as a matter of its own law, which is largely a question for legislatures like the ones many in this room served in. Those are not the same inquiry, and a good deal of the disagreement eases once they are kept apart. But where the constitutional line falls is exactly what the courts are deciding — and so it is the one thing I should not decide from this chair.

Thank you, Senator. I’m glad to say more about the office, or about how I approach questions of this kind in general, if it would be useful.


(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Senator, thank you — both for the welcome you have extended to my family and for the generous words about how I came to be here. I am mindful that the story you describe was written far more by my parents than by me, and I am grateful you would begin there. Let me take your questions in the order you asked them.

On judicial philosophy. I confess I have always been a little wary of the phrase, because it can suggest that a judge arrives at a case already knowing where he wishes to end up. If I have a philosophy, it is one of modesty. It begins from a simple fact: a judge is not an elected official, and that ought to make him cautious rather than bold. My task would be to decide the dispute actually before me, on the narrowest ground that resolves it, with fidelity to the text that governs — whether a statute or the Constitution — and with respect for the decisions of those who sat before me. I try to keep an open mind until the briefing and argument are complete, and to be honest with myself about the point at which my own preferences end and the law’s command begins. Those two are not always the same, and the whole discipline of judging lies in telling them apart.

On the proper role of a Justice. The Court’s authority, as Chief Justice Marshall described it, is to say what the law is — not what it ought to be. A Justice decides cases and controversies; he does not issue pronouncements on the questions of the day, however pressing they may seem. The hardest part of the role, to my mind, is restraint. The Constitution commits most of the great choices of our national life to the people and their elected representatives, and a Justice must resist the temptation to substitute his judgment for theirs simply because a given case gives him the power to do it. Where the Constitution or a statute speaks, the Court must enforce it without flinching, even when the result is unpopular. Where it does not speak, the Court should be slow to supply an answer the democratic branches have not. Both halves of that matter; a Justice who honors only one of them is not doing the job.

On recusal. The standard is not a matter of personal preference or convenience — it is set by statute, in 28 U.S.C. § 455, and by the Code of Conduct. A judge must step aside where he holds a financial interest in the outcome, where a close family member is involved, where he served as a lawyer in the very matter, and, more broadly, in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Having spent years in the Solicitor General’s office, I would expect to recuse from the cases I personally worked on there, and in a genuinely close call I would err toward stepping aside. But I would offer one caution running the other way: recusal is not costless. On a Court of nine there is no one to fill a recused Justice’s seat, and a reflexive willingness to withdraw can leave the Court unable to resolve questions the country needs resolved. So the duty runs in both directions — to sit when one properly can, and to withdraw without hesitation when the standard is met.

On reading an ambiguous statute. I would start where Justice Scalia taught a generation of us to start — with the words. Most questions are answered by reading the provision carefully, in the ordinary meaning its terms carried when they were enacted, and in the context of the whole statute: its structure, its neighboring provisions, the way the parts fit together. Genuine ambiguity is rarer than it is asserted to be. But when a text truly does not resolve the matter, I do not think a judge should pretend otherwise, or simply choose. I would turn to the traditional tools — the settled canons of construction, the evident purpose and design of the statute, and, where it is reliable, the record of its enactment. And some ambiguities are governed by rules we agree upon in advance: the presumption that Congress does not lightly intend to raise serious constitutional doubts, for example, or the rule of lenity in the criminal law. The aim throughout is the same — to find the meaning Congress enacted, not the one the judge might have preferred it to enact.

I am glad to go further on any of these, Senator, and I thank you again for where you chose to begin.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)


Thank you, Judge, for your answers. I appreciate your mention of Justice Scalia. I am sure there will be more questions from my colleagues in this vein. I'd like to focus now on your work in the private sector.

*a staffer for Senator Bailey distributes a batch of folders to the other senators as well as Judge Srinivasan*

Mr. Chair and Judge Srinivasan, I’d like to provide you all and my fellow Senators with a copy of Judge Judith W. Rogers' summary and opinion from John Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125. Judge Srinivasan, I am sure you will recognize this document as you were serving as the cross-appellate attorney for Exxon in this matter.

For those in the room unfamiliar with this case, I'd ask you all to turn to page three.
“Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon’s security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), and various common law torts.”

If you go to page 5, Judge Rogers summarizes these accusations in more details with direct quotes from the accusation.

“In addition to extrajudicial killings of some of the plaintiffs-appellants’ husbands as part of a “systematic campaign of extermination of the people of Aceh by [d]efendants’ [Indonesian] security forces,” id. ¶ 65, the plaintiffs-appellants were “beaten, burned, shocked with cattle prods, kicked and subjected to other forms of brutality and cruelty” amounting to torture, id. ¶ 66, as well as forcibly removed and detained for lengthy periods of time, id. ¶ 67. Plaintiffs-appellants claim that Exxon or its agents, by decisions made in the United States, id. ¶¶ 30, 32–33, and at its Aceh plant, id. ¶¶ 55–57, “committed acts that had the intent and the effect of grossly humiliating and debasing” either them or their deceased husbands by “forcing them to act against their will and conscience, inciting fear and anguish, and breaking their physical and/or moral resistance” by actions that constitute “inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of the law of nations.”

Now Judge Srinivasan, of course no one here would ever dare insinuate that you yourself committed these acts or approved of them. But you were hired by Exxon to defend them on cross-appeal. I'd like to now turn back to page three where your argument was directly laid out.

“Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia raising for the first time that as a corporation it was immune from liability under the ATS.” (Alien Tort Statute)

That was your argument, Judge Srinivasan: that corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute, even if they allegedly arranged the torture, rape, and murder of their own employees.

Do you stand by that position?
 
Question 1:

Judge Srinivasan, before joining the bench, you represented Rio Tinto in litigation where the corporation argued that it was immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute, even when the alleged conduct involved grave human rights violations.


I understand that an attorney represents the position of his client. But you are now seeking a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, so the American people deserve to understand your own judicial philosophy.


Do you believe corporations should ever enjoy categorical immunity from civil accountability for conduct that would expose an individual to liability? How do you reconcile granting corporations the protections and privileges of legal personhood while denying victims a remedy when those same corporations are accused of enabling torture, forced labor or other serious abuses?

Second question:

Judge Srinivasan, Citizens United rests partly on the conclusion that unlimited independent spending by corporations does not create corruption or even the appearance of corruption.


Do you believe that conclusion reflects political reality? When corporations can spend extraordinary sums influencing elections, gain access to elected officials and then lobby those same officials on taxes, regulations and government contracts, what constitutional authority does Congress retain to protect democratic self government from concentrated corporate power?
 
Thank you, Judge, for your answers. I appreciate your mention of Justice Scalia. I am sure there will be more questions from my colleagues in this vein. I'd like to focus now on your work in the private sector.

*a staffer for Senator Bailey distributes a batch of folders to the other senators as well as Judge Srinivasan*

Mr. Chair and Judge Srinivasan, I’d like to provide you all and my fellow Senators with a copy of Judge Judith W. Rogers' summary and opinion from John Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125. Judge Srinivasan, I am sure you will recognize this document as you were serving as the cross-appellate attorney for Exxon in this matter.

For those in the room unfamiliar with this case, I'd ask you all to turn to page three.


If you go to page 5, Judge Rogers summarizes these accusations in more details with direct quotes from the accusation.



Now Judge Srinivasan, of course no one here would ever dare insinuate that you yourself committed these acts or approved of them. But you were hired by Exxon to defend them on cross-appeal. I'd like to now turn back to page three where your argument was directly laid out.



That was your argument, Judge Srinivasan: that corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute, even if they allegedly arranged the torture, rape, and murder of their own employees.

Do you stand by that position?
Senator, thank you for the folder, and for stating plainly that no one here is attributing those acts to me. I’ll answer directly, but I need to correct two things in the framing first, because they matter.

The first is the record itself. The document you’ve handed out is Judge Rogers’ opinion — and that opinion rejected the argument you’re asking me about. The D.C. Circuit held that corporations are not immune under the Alien Tort Statute. So the position I advanced as an advocate did not carry the day; the court ruled the other way, and the plaintiffs’ case was allowed to proceed. If the concern in this room is whether corporations can be held to account under that statute, the very opinion before you is the law saying they can.

The second is the nature of the allegations and the parties. Those are the plaintiffs’ allegations, and they are grave — if proven, they describe conduct no decent person would defend, and I won’t pretend otherwise. But they were allegations the court was not deciding the truth of, and the plaintiffs were Indonesian villagers, not, as you put it, Exxon’s own employees. I want the record clear on that, not to minimize the horror of what was alleged, but because precision is the least this subject deserves.

Now to your question — do I stand by the position. Let me separate the advocate from the judge, because the whole of my answer lives in that distinction.

What I argued on cross-appeal was not that a company which arranges murder should walk free. It was a question of statutory reach: whether the Alien Tort Statute — a single sentence enacted in 1789, which the Supreme Court in Sosa instructed courts to read with great caution — extends to corporate defendants as a category, or only to natural persons. That was a genuinely open question at the time. The Second Circuit, in Kiobel, had held that it does not reach corporations. Judges of real distinction disagreed with one another about it, which is precisely why the Supreme Court took up the surrounding questions soon after. I made my client’s argument on an unsettled point of law on which reasonable jurists were divided. That is what an appellate advocate does, and I’d note the plaintiffs had able counsel making the opposite argument — which prevailed.

As for whether I stand by it today, Senator, here I have to be careful, and I’ll tell you honestly why. The scope of the Alien Tort Statute is a question that may well return to the Supreme Court. It would be wrong for me to sit in this chair and tell you how I’d vote on it. What I can tell you is this: the brief was my client’s position, not my personal verdict on what the law should be, and I don’t think a lawyer’s advocacy should be read as a confession of his convictions. Were it otherwise, no one who had ever practiced law could be trusted to judge. And I can tell you that as a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit, I am bound by Doe VIII — the very opinion in your folder — as the law of my circuit, and I apply it as written, whatever I argued in 2011. That is the discipline the robe demands, and it is the same discipline I would carry to the Court above.

I’ll close with this, because I don’t want to hide behind the distinction. You’re entitled to ask how a nominee thinks about corporate accountability for grave abuses, and it’s a fair thing to want an answer on. I’d simply ask that you take the measure of it from how I’ve decided cases, and from the oath I’ve kept to follow the law where it leads — not from the hardest argument a client ever asked me to make.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)

(OOC: Reed here. lol, lmao, I love that I actually know what he's talking about).
 
Senator, thank you for the folder, and for stating plainly that no one here is attributing those acts to me. I’ll answer directly, but I need to correct two things in the framing first, because they matter.

The first is the record itself. The document you’ve handed out is Judge Rogers’ opinion — and that opinion rejected the argument you’re asking me about. The D.C. Circuit held that corporations are not immune under the Alien Tort Statute. So the position I advanced as an advocate did not carry the day; the court ruled the other way, and the plaintiffs’ case was allowed to proceed. If the concern in this room is whether corporations can be held to account under that statute, the very opinion before you is the law saying they can.

The second is the nature of the allegations and the parties. Those are the plaintiffs’ allegations, and they are grave — if proven, they describe conduct no decent person would defend, and I won’t pretend otherwise. But they were allegations the court was not deciding the truth of, and the plaintiffs were Indonesian villagers, not, as you put it, Exxon’s own employees. I want the record clear on that, not to minimize the horror of what was alleged, but because precision is the least this subject deserves.

Now to your question — do I stand by the position. Let me separate the advocate from the judge, because the whole of my answer lives in that distinction.

What I argued on cross-appeal was not that a company which arranges murder should walk free. It was a question of statutory reach: whether the Alien Tort Statute — a single sentence enacted in 1789, which the Supreme Court in Sosa instructed courts to read with great caution — extends to corporate defendants as a category, or only to natural persons. That was a genuinely open question at the time. The Second Circuit, in Kiobel, had held that it does not reach corporations. Judges of real distinction disagreed with one another about it, which is precisely why the Supreme Court took up the surrounding questions soon after. I made my client’s argument on an unsettled point of law on which reasonable jurists were divided. That is what an appellate advocate does, and I’d note the plaintiffs had able counsel making the opposite argument — which prevailed.

As for whether I stand by it today, Senator, here I have to be careful, and I’ll tell you honestly why. The scope of the Alien Tort Statute is a question that may well return to the Supreme Court. It would be wrong for me to sit in this chair and tell you how I’d vote on it. What I can tell you is this: the brief was my client’s position, not my personal verdict on what the law should be, and I don’t think a lawyer’s advocacy should be read as a confession of his convictions. Were it otherwise, no one who had ever practiced law could be trusted to judge. And I can tell you that as a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit, I am bound by Doe VIII — the very opinion in your folder — as the law of my circuit, and I apply it as written, whatever I argued in 2011. That is the discipline the robe demands, and it is the same discipline I would carry to the Court above.

I’ll close with this, because I don’t want to hide behind the distinction. You’re entitled to ask how a nominee thinks about corporate accountability for grave abuses, and it’s a fair thing to want an answer on. I’d simply ask that you take the measure of it from how I’ve decided cases, and from the oath I’ve kept to follow the law where it leads — not from the hardest argument a client ever asked me to make.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)

(OOC: Reed here. lol, lmao, I love that I actually know what he's talking about).


Judge, I did not ask you to determine whether or not the plaintiff's allegations were true or not. Nor do I believe that you would willy-nilly reject precedent. However, we aren't hiring another attorney. We're confirming the next Supreme Court justice who will be asked to weigh in on countless cases involving labor. And if confirmed, you would be in the unique position of being able to overturn precedent entirely.

You say your client asked you to make the hardest argument you've ever made in this case. If the question of this case and its precedent were to come up for review at the Supreme Court, would you stand by the argument of corporate immunity under ATS as you argued in this case?
 
Judge, Senator Bailey asked whether you stand by an argument you made for a client in 2011. You told him the court rejected it, and that today you're bound by that very opinion as the law of your circuit. I want to press on that. Has your own record on the bench ever gone against the side you once argued for, or against the kind of client you used to represent? When a precedent cuts against what you once said in a brief, how do you make sure the person across from you gets the same judge as everyone else?"

Judge, I've listened to my colleagues try to pin you down for most of today. Senator Johansen asked about Windsor, Senator Callahan about corporations and elections, Senator Bailey about Exxon. Each of us is trying to work out which way you'll lean. So let me ask the question from the other direction. Tell this Committee about a time your method led you to a result that would surprise whichever side assumed you were theirs. How should the folks watching at home know you'll disappoint everyone equally when the law demands it?

You told Senator Bailey that on a Court of nine there's no one to fill a recused Justice's seat. We're not at nine. Back in my hospital days, an empty chair on the surgical team didn't mean the surgery got canceled. It meant everybody else carried more weight and some patients waited. When this Court splits four to four, what actually happens to a farmer in my state and a farmer in Texas whose cases came out differently in two circuits? I'm not asking you to comment on anything this body does. I'm asking what the people who depend on this Court live with when it can't resolve the question.
 
Edited answer, because I don't want to mis-answer a case
Question 1:

Judge Srinivasan, before joining the bench, you represented Rio Tinto in litigation where the corporation argued that it was immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute, even when the alleged conduct involved grave human rights violations.


I understand that an attorney represents the position of his client. But you are now seeking a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, so the American people deserve to understand your own judicial philosophy.


Do you believe corporations should ever enjoy categorical immunity from civil accountability for conduct that would expose an individual to liability? How do you reconcile granting corporations the protections and privileges of legal personhood while denying victims a remedy when those same corporations are accused of enabling torture, forced labor or other serious abuses?

Second question:

Judge Srinivasan, Citizens United rests partly on the conclusion that unlimited independent spending by corporations does not create corruption or even the appearance of corruption.


Do you believe that conclusion reflects political reality? When corporations can spend extraordinary sums influencing elections, gain access to elected officials and then lobby those same officials on taxes, regulations and government contracts, what constitutional authority does Congress retain to protect democratic self government from concentrated corporate power?
Senator Callahan, thank you. You’ve drawn exactly the right line — between what a lawyer argues and what a judge believes — and then asked me to speak on my own side of it. I’ll do that as far as the chair I hope to sit in allows, and I’ll tell you honestly where the line falls.

On corporate immunity and a victim’s remedy. You’re right that I represented Rio Tinto. I argued for the company in the Ninth Circuit, in litigation brought by residents of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and the principal argument I pressed there was that the plaintiffs should have been required to pursue their claims in the courts of Papua New Guinea before coming to ours. I also represented Exxon in the D.C. Circuit, in the case Senator Bailey placed before you a moment ago, where the court rejected the corporate-immunity argument I had advanced. I won’t minimize either matter. Both involved grave allegations, and both clients took positions that the plaintiffs, and many people in this room, found hard to accept. They were my clients’ positions, argued as an advocate is obliged to argue them, and I’d ask you to weigh them as that.

Now to the principle, which is what you actually asked about, and which I can speak to because it goes to method rather than to a case I’d have to decide. You ask whether a corporation should ever enjoy categorical immunity from civil accountability for conduct that would expose a natural person to liability. Speaking of how I approach such questions: categorical immunities are disfavored in our law, and for good reason. When one exists, it is almost always because a legislature created it, deliberately and in words — sovereign immunity, certain official immunities, and the like — and a court should be slow to invent one the legislature did not write. The default of the common law, and of most of our statutes, is that a wrongdoer answers for the wrong. So I’d not start from a presumption that a corporate form, by itself, is a shield against accountability.

But I want to be candid about where that general principle stops and a real case begins, because the honest answer has two parts. Whether a particular statute reaches corporations is a question of that statute — its text, its history, whom Congress meant to bind. The Alien Tort Statute is one such question, and it is precisely the one that may return to the Supreme Court, so it’s the one I must not answer from this chair. The reconciliation you ask about — between the privileges the law extends to corporations and the remedies it owes their victims — is real, and I won’t pretend it dissolves on contact. I’d only say that it is resolved statute by statute and doctrine by doctrine, not by a single slogan. “Corporations are people” decides nothing; neither does “corporations are never people.” The law has always treated the corporate form as an instrument — granting it some human attributes, withholding others — and the whole work is in sorting which is which, in each context, honestly.

On Citizens United. Here I can be more forthcoming, because you’re asking me to describe a decided precedent and the disagreement within it — not to pre-commit on a live case. I’ll mark the one place I have to stop.

You’ve stated the holding fairly. The majority concluded that independent expenditures, as distinct from direct contributions to a candidate, do not give rise to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the First Amendment therefore does not permit banning them based on the speaker’s corporate identity. And you’ve put your finger on exactly the premise the dissenters contested. Justice Stevens, writing for four, argued that the majority had defined corruption too narrowly — that it had set aside Congress’s considered judgment, built on a long record, that vast concentrations of wealth distort the democratic process in ways that go beyond an envelope of cash for a vote. That was not a quiet disagreement. It was a fundamental one about both the Constitution and the facts of political life, and I won’t flatten it by pretending the case was easy or the vote lopsided. It was neither.

Do I believe the majority’s empirical conclusion reflects political reality? Senator, that is the heart of a question that is litigated still, and it is the one thing I should not answer — because to tell you my view of whether Citizens United got the facts right is to tell you how I’d lean if asked to revisit it, and parties with real cases are entitled to a judge who hasn’t announced the answer in advance. What I can tell you is how I’d approach it: Citizens United is a precedent of the Court, and stare decisis means it is owed real weight — it is not discarded because a Justice would have voted the other way. But that weight is not infinite. The doctrine itself recognizes that a precedent’s factual premises can be tested against experience, and an argument that a decision’s real-world assumptions have not held up is exactly the kind of argument that can be made to a court. Whether it should prevail is for the case, on a record, with both sides heard.

On your narrower question — what authority Congress retains — I can answer plainly, because that’s a matter of existing law and not a forecast. Citizens United left a good deal standing. It did not disturb the constitutionality of limits on direct contributions to candidates, which the Court has long upheld on precisely the anti-corruption rationale you invoke. It expressly affirmed Congress’s power to require disclosure and disclaimer — by an eight-to-one margin, in fact — so the electorate can know who is paying for the speech aimed at it. And it did nothing to limit the power to prosecute actual bribery, which remains a crime. So the field in which Congress may still act to protect self-government from quid pro quo corruption is not barren. How much more it may do — whether the anti-distortion interest the dissent urged can support more than that — is the contested ground, and it is contested in court, which is where I’ll leave it.

Thank you, Senator. These sit right on the seam between what a nominee may discuss and what he’s bound to reserve, and I’ve tried to give you everything on my side of that seam and to be honest about why I stop where I do.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Judge, I did not ask you to determine whether or not the plaintiff's allegations were true or not. Nor do I believe that you would willy-nilly reject precedent. However, we aren't hiring another attorney. We're confirming the next Supreme Court justice who will be asked to weigh in on countless cases involving labor. And if confirmed, you would be in the unique position of being able to overturn precedent entirely.

You say your client asked you to make the hardest argument you've ever made in this case. If the question of this case and its precedent were to come up for review at the Supreme Court, would you stand by the argument of corporate immunity under ATS as you argued in this case?
Senator, that’s a fair sharpening of the question, and you’re right to draw the distinction. A Justice sits where no court sits above him. “I am bound by the precedent” is an answer that belongs to the judge I am now, not the one you’re considering. So I won’t hide behind it. You’ve asked me the real question, and you deserve a plain account of where the line is and why it’s there.

I can’t tell you how I’d vote if corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute came back to the Supreme Court. That isn’t reluctance to be candid with this body. That question can, and likely will, come before the Court, with real parties, a real record, and briefing on both sides. A nominee who announces from this chair how he’d decide it does two corrosive things. He tells future litigants their case is decided before they walk in the door. And he makes this hearing the place where Supreme Court cases are actually resolved, as the price of confirmation, instead of in the courtroom on the law. Every nominee of either party, confirmed by senators of both parties, has declined to make that trade, for the same reason. A litigant whose rights turn on that question is entitled to a Justice who comes to it with an open mind, not one who pledged his vote to the Senate to get the robe.

So I want to be clear about the difference between what I won’t do and what I will. I won’t promise you an outcome. I will tell you how I’d approach the question, so you can judge the method even though I can’t give you the result. On this question you’ve already heard it. I told Senator Callahan that categorical immunities are disfavored in our law, that a court should be slow to create one the legislature didn’t write, and that the baseline of our system is that a wrongdoer answers for the wrong. That is how I think, and you can see for yourself which way it points. What I can’t do is take the last step and turn a way of thinking into a committed vote on a live case.

I’ll also tell you something you’ll find in the record if you look, because I’d rather you hear it from me. When the panel ruled against Exxon, I asked the full D.C. Circuit to rehear the case. I argued, publicly, that the decision had greatly expanded the statute and would draw litigation into American courts with little connection to this country. I didn’t stop at one brief. I pressed my client’s position as far as the rules allowed, which is what a client is entitled to expect. The full court declined to rehear it, and the panel’s decision is the law I now apply. I mention it because I’d rather be measured by an honest account of my advocacy than by a flattering one.

Finally, Senator, you raised labor, and that deserves an answer of its own. My record as an advocate runs in more than one direction. In 2012 I was counsel of record before the Supreme Court for Cheryl Perich, a teacher who was fired after she fell ill and sought to return to work, and who argued that federal employment-discrimination law protected her. The Court ruled unanimously against her, and against me. I mention it not to balance a ledger, but because it shows the same thing the Exxon case does. Over a career an appellate lawyer stands where his clients put him, sometimes with the company and sometimes with the worker. None of those positions tells you how he’ll rule. What tells you is whether he follows the law where it leads, even when his sympathies pull the other way. That is the only promise I can make to this body that would still be true the day after you confirmed me.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Judge, Senator Bailey asked whether you stand by an argument you made for a client in 2011. You told him the court rejected it, and that today you're bound by that very opinion as the law of your circuit. I want to press on that. Has your own record on the bench ever gone against the side you once argued for, or against the kind of client you used to represent? When a precedent cuts against what you once said in a brief, how do you make sure the person across from you gets the same judge as everyone else?"

Judge, I've listened to my colleagues try to pin you down for most of today. Senator Johansen asked about Windsor, Senator Callahan about corporations and elections, Senator Bailey about Exxon. Each of us is trying to work out which way you'll lean. So let me ask the question from the other direction. Tell this Committee about a time your method led you to a result that would surprise whichever side assumed you were theirs. How should the folks watching at home know you'll disappoint everyone equally when the law demands it?

You told Senator Bailey that on a Court of nine there's no one to fill a recused Justice's seat. We're not at nine. Back in my hospital days, an empty chair on the surgical team didn't mean the surgery got canceled. It meant everybody else carried more weight and some patients waited. When this Court splits four to four, what actually happens to a farmer in my state and a farmer in Texas whose cases came out differently in two circuits? I'm not asking you to comment on anything this body does. I'm asking what the people who depend on this Court live with when it can't resolve the question.
Senators, thank you. These three questions belong together, and I’m grateful for them. Each one asks me to stop describing my method and show you its results. Let me try.

On whether my record on the bench has gone against the kind of client I once represented. It has, Senator, and more than once. In private practice I represented companies, sometimes against workers and sometimes against people alleging grave abuses. Here is what I’ve done since taking the oath.

When home-care agencies challenged a Department of Labor rule extending federal overtime protection to home health aides employed by those agencies, I wrote the court’s opinion upholding the rule. Those aides do some of the hardest work in this country for some of the lowest pay, and the statute protected them.

When an engine manufacturer violated a consent decree with the government, I wrote the opinion upholding the finding of violation and a penalty of $72 million.

When a company that had been found to engage in deceptive advertising argued that the First Amendment shielded it, I wrote the opinion rejecting that argument.

And since my Exxon work has been the subject of much of today, there is one more case you should know. Congress required companies to disclose whether their products contain minerals that may finance armed groups in the Congo region. When manufacturers challenged that disclosure rule, the majority of my panel struck down part of it on First Amendment grounds. I dissented. I would have upheld it.

I don’t offer these cases as a scorecard. A judge who keeps one has already stopped judging. I offer them because you asked whether the person across from me gets the same judge as everyone else, and the honest answer is that I don’t know who my former clients’ adversaries are when I open a brief. I know what the statute says. Where I worked on a matter, or where my impartiality might reasonably be questioned, I step aside. Where I don’t, I read the case as if I had never seen the issue before. The briefs I wrote as a lawyer were arguments made for someone else. The opinions I write as a judge are the law, and the law doesn’t know whose side I used to sit on.

On a time my method surprised the side that assumed I was theirs. Senator, I could give you one example for each side, which may be the best answer to your question.

To anyone who assumes a Democratic appointee will reliably side with the people who come to court to challenge authority: I wrote the opinion upholding the ban on demonstrations on the Supreme Court’s own plaza against a First Amendment challenge. I wrote the opinion rejecting a prisoner’s reading of the filing-fee statute, and the Supreme Court later affirmed it unanimously. I wrote an opinion dismissing a human rights suit against a foreign government, because the sovereign immunity statute required it. I didn’t enjoy that result. The statute did not leave me a choice.

To anyone who assumes a former corporate lawyer will reliably side with business: there are the overtime case and the mining-disclosure dissent I just described. And in a False Claims Act case I dissented from my colleagues in a way that kept a whistleblower’s case alive against a defense contractor. The Supreme Court later unanimously adopted the reading I had given in dissent.

How should the people watching at home know I’ll disappoint everyone equally when the law demands it? I’d ask them not to take my word for it. Take the record. A careful reading of my decisions on that court found that they don’t add up to an ideology, and that most were unanimous, joined by judges appointed by presidents of both parties. That’s not because I’m cautious. It’s because when you start with the text and follow it, you end up in places neither side picked in advance.

On what an evenly divided Court means for the farmer. Senator, I’ll answer this exactly as you asked it, as a description of how the Court works and not as a comment on anything this body does.

When the Supreme Court divides four to four, it doesn’t decide the question. It affirms the judgment below, without an opinion, and that affirmance sets no precedent. The farmer whose case was in front of the Court gets an answer for himself. Nobody else gets one. So if the Eighth Circuit, which covers your state, reads a federal statute one way and the Fifth Circuit, which covers Texas, reads it the other, both readings stay the law in their regions. One federal law means two different things depending on which side of a circuit line your farm sits on. The farmer in Minnesota and the farmer in Texas pay different costs, face different liability, and get different remedies under the same act of Congress, and neither can do anything about it. Lawyers start choosing where to file based on which circuit’s version of the law they prefer. Businesses operating in both regions have to comply with two rules or guess. The Court can hold a case over or set it for reargument, but that only delays the answer.

That’s also why I offered the caution I did to Senator Bailey’s colleague about recusal. A Justice who steps aside unnecessarily can produce exactly this result. It isn’t a hypothetical risk. It’s the practical cost of a missing vote, whatever the reason the vote is missing. And your surgical comparison is apt: the work doesn’t stop, but everything gets slower and less certain, and the people waiting are the ones who pay for it.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
Senator, that’s a fair sharpening of the question, and you’re right to draw the distinction. A Justice sits where no court sits above him. “I am bound by the precedent” is an answer that belongs to the judge I am now, not the one you’re considering. So I won’t hide behind it. You’ve asked me the real question, and you deserve a plain account of where the line is and why it’s there.

I can’t tell you how I’d vote if corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute came back to the Supreme Court. That isn’t reluctance to be candid with this body. That question can, and likely will, come before the Court, with real parties, a real record, and briefing on both sides. A nominee who announces from this chair how he’d decide it does two corrosive things. He tells future litigants their case is decided before they walk in the door. And he makes this hearing the place where Supreme Court cases are actually resolved, as the price of confirmation, instead of in the courtroom on the law. Every nominee of either party, confirmed by senators of both parties, has declined to make that trade, for the same reason. A litigant whose rights turn on that question is entitled to a Justice who comes to it with an open mind, not one who pledged his vote to the Senate to get the robe.

So I want to be clear about the difference between what I won’t do and what I will. I won’t promise you an outcome. I will tell you how I’d approach the question, so you can judge the method even though I can’t give you the result. On this question you’ve already heard it. I told Senator Callahan that categorical immunities are disfavored in our law, that a court should be slow to create one the legislature didn’t write, and that the baseline of our system is that a wrongdoer answers for the wrong. That is how I think, and you can see for yourself which way it points. What I can’t do is take the last step and turn a way of thinking into a committed vote on a live case.

I’ll also tell you something you’ll find in the record if you look, because I’d rather you hear it from me. When the panel ruled against Exxon, I asked the full D.C. Circuit to rehear the case. I argued, publicly, that the decision had greatly expanded the statute and would draw litigation into American courts with little connection to this country. I didn’t stop at one brief. I pressed my client’s position as far as the rules allowed, which is what a client is entitled to expect. The full court declined to rehear it, and the panel’s decision is the law I now apply. I mention it because I’d rather be measured by an honest account of my advocacy than by a flattering one.

Finally, Senator, you raised labor, and that deserves an answer of its own. My record as an advocate runs in more than one direction. In 2012 I was counsel of record before the Supreme Court for Cheryl Perich, a teacher who was fired after she fell ill and sought to return to work, and who argued that federal employment-discrimination law protected her. The Court ruled unanimously against her, and against me. I mention it not to balance a ledger, but because it shows the same thing the Exxon case does. Over a career an appellate lawyer stands where his clients put him, sometimes with the company and sometimes with the worker. None of those positions tells you how he’ll rule. What tells you is whether he follows the law where it leads, even when his sympathies pull the other way. That is the only promise I can make to this body that would still be true the day after you confirmed me.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)


Judge, thank you for candor. I have many grave concerns about your work on behalf of Exxon and Enron. That said, as weigh your nomination, I will keep in mind the fact that all individuals in our legal system are entitled to counsel. While you did choose to defend Exxon from accusations of human rights abuses as well as Jeff Skilling in criminal court, you were filling a needed role.

hat said, I want to focus on your work at the Department of Justice. Earlier on in this hearing, you were asked by my colleague Senator Johansen whether you had exercised sober-minded and balanced judgment to the best of your abilities while serving in the Solicitor General’s office. You answered in the affirmative. I am glad that you understand the unique and distinct responsibilities that come with serving at the DOJ versus private practice—that your duties at DOJ were to serve the public interest for justice and accountability.

Judge Srinivasan, I’m sure you are familiar with Watters v. Wachovia. You were among the authors of this brief. And as I understand it, the United States was not even a party to this case, yet you and your colleagues chose to file this brief in support of Wachovia against the state of Michigan. In this case, the state of Michigan was arguing to the court that it needed the authority to protect Michiganders from abusive lending practices by the major mortgage lenders. Your brief completely dismissed the state of Michigan. To quote from it:

“In any event, the petitioner's policy concerns are beside the point.”

You also told the Court the OCC saw no reason to believe abusive practices were occurring in any noteworthy way in the financial sector or housing market. Again, to quote directly from your brief, you wrote that there is...

"no reason to believe that [abusive] practices are occurring in the national banking system to any significant degree."

Judge, that was November 2006. Four years later, one in 33 Michigan homes had received a foreclosure notice. If losing almost half a million blue-collar jobs wasn’t bad enough, nearly as Michigan families lost their homes as well.

State authorities tried to stop these predatory mortgage lenders. Yet in this brief, you called their concerns “beside the point” and threw the full weight of the United States federal government directly against Michigan's efforts to avoid the eventual housing crisis.

Judge, that was your sober-minded call and judgement. You weren't in private practice fulfilling a constitutional duty to a client. Your task and role was to be fairminded and to put the public interest for jsutice first. This was you and your colleagues stepping into a case—to which the federal government was NOT a party—in order to block efforts to protect Michigan homeowners. So I ask you, ten years later, do you stand by that brief?
 
Judge, thank you for candor. I have many grave concerns about your work on behalf of Exxon and Enron. That said, as weigh your nomination, I will keep in mind the fact that all individuals in our legal system are entitled to counsel. While you did choose to defend Exxon from accusations of human rights abuses as well as Jeff Skilling in criminal court, you were filling a needed role.

hat said, I want to focus on your work at the Department of Justice. Earlier on in this hearing, you were asked by my colleague Senator Johansen whether you had exercised sober-minded and balanced judgment to the best of your abilities while serving in the Solicitor General’s office. You answered in the affirmative. I am glad that you understand the unique and distinct responsibilities that come with serving at the DOJ versus private practice—that your duties at DOJ were to serve the public interest for justice and accountability.

Judge Srinivasan, I’m sure you are familiar with Watters v. Wachovia. You were among the authors of this brief. And as I understand it, the United States was not even a party to this case, yet you and your colleagues chose to file this brief in support of Wachovia against the state of Michigan. In this case, the state of Michigan was arguing to the court that it needed the authority to protect Michiganders from abusive lending practices by the major mortgage lenders. Your brief completely dismissed the state of Michigan. To quote from it:





Judge, that was November 2006. Four years later, one in 33 Michigan homes had received a foreclosure notice. If losing almost half a million blue-collar jobs wasn’t bad enough, nearly as Michigan families lost their homes as well.

State authorities tried to stop these predatory mortgage lenders. Yet in this brief, you called their concerns “beside the point” and threw the full weight of the United States federal government directly against Michigan's efforts to avoid the eventual housing crisis.

Judge, that was your sober-minded call and judgement. You weren't in private practice fulfilling a constitutional duty to a client. Your task and role was to be fairminded and to put the public interest for jsutice first. This was you and your colleagues stepping into a case—to which the federal government was NOT a party—in order to block efforts to protect Michigan homeowners. So I ask you, ten years later, do you stand by that brief?
Senator, thank you, and thank you for what you said at the outset about the right to counsel. Given your concerns, that was a generous thing to say, and I don’t take it lightly.

You’ve invoked the answer I gave Senator Johansen, so let me hold myself to it. I told this Committee the Solicitor General’s office is not an ordinary advocate, and I meant it. But its duty of candor sits alongside a second duty, and that second duty explains this brief. The Department of Justice defends the laws of the United States. When a federal statute, or a regulation lawfully adopted under one, is challenged in court, the government’s lawyers defend it whenever a reasonable argument supports it. Administrations of both parties have followed that practice for generations, and for a good reason. If the government’s lawyers defended only the federal rules they personally liked, or only those whose consequences they could predict, the Executive could repeal by litigation what it couldn’t repeal by law.

That duty has one narrow exception, and since Senator Johansen asked me about Windsor, I won’t pretend otherwise. When the Executive concludes that a law is unconstitutional, not merely unwise, it may decline to defend it. Even then it continues to enforce the law and tells Congress, so that Congress can defend it. That is what happened with DOMA. But no one in the Executive concluded that the Comptroller’s rules were unconstitutional, and when the case was decided, no Justice did either. The objections to them went to their wisdom, and disagreement over wisdom is exactly what the duty to defend does not excuse.

That is why the United States was in that case although it wasn’t a party. The question before the Court was the validity of regulations issued by the Comptroller of the Currency under the National Bank Act. Those were federal rules, adopted through notice and comment under authority Congress had given, and the Court had already asked for the government’s views on the same question in a related case. When the Comptroller’s rules are on trial, the United States answers for them. The brief did support Wachovia against Michigan. But it did so to defend federal law, not to pass judgment on whether Michigan’s concerns mattered.

The argument we made was a serious one, and I’d ask you to judge it on the law. Since 1864 the National Bank Act has created a national banking system that operates under federal supervision. In a line of decisions running from the nineteenth century through Barnett Bank in 1996, the Court has held that the powers Congress grants national banks ordinarily displace contrary state limits, unless Congress says otherwise. Since 1966 national banks have been allowed to conduct their business through operating subsidiaries, and in 1999 Congress recognized that such subsidiaries operate on the same terms and conditions as the parent bank. The question was whether Michigan could license, examine, and police a subsidiary doing exactly what the parent bank could do free of state control. Our answer was no, and the Court agreed. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion rested on the National Bank Act itself, not merely on deference to the agency.

I would also add one point of context, because it matters to the families you’re speaking for. The rules at issue did not leave Michigan homeowners without law. State contract law, tort law, criminal law, and debt-collection law continued to apply to the extent they only incidentally touched the bank’s lending. What the rule displaced was Michigan’s separate licensing and examination regime for a subsidiary already supervised by a federal regulator.

As for the line you quoted about Michigan’s policy concerns being “beside the point,” that was an argument about which institution decides, not a statement that Michigan’s people didn’t count. It rested on a settled principle: when an agency acts within the authority Congress gave it, a court does not second-guess the wisdom of the policy. The remedy for a bad federal policy lies with Congress. And the legal question was genuinely close. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and by Justice Scalia, whose seat I’ve been nominated to fill. They argued that a separately incorporated subsidiary shouldn’t share the bank’s immunity from state law without a clear statement from Congress. That is a respectable federalism argument, and it lost five to three.

What happened next is how the system is supposed to work. The Court read the law as Congress had written it. When experience showed the rule was wrong, the people’s representatives changed it. In 2010 Congress provided that national banks’ subsidiaries and affiliates no longer share the bank’s preemption of state law. The brief told the Court where the power to fix it lay, and Congress used that power.

Now the part I won’t defend. The brief told the Court, on the Comptroller’s authority, that there was no reason to believe abusive lending was occurring in the national banking system to any significant degree. The finding was the agency’s, but the brief that carried it to the Court had my name on it, and I won’t distance myself from it. It was wrong. Within two years the crisis had reached deep into national banks and their subsidiaries. I won’t pretend to this Committee that I can trace exactly which Michigan family lost which home to which federal decision; the causes of that crisis were many, and people of good faith still argue about them. But I won’t defend the forecast, and I won’t pretend that the soundness of the legal argument redeems it. They are different things. The government’s lawyer has a duty to defend the government’s law. He has no power to make the government’s predictions come true. The lesson I took is one a judge needs: an expert agency’s prediction is still a prediction, and the people who bear the cost of its being wrong are rarely in the courtroom. A court cannot substitute its own policy for one that Congress has committed elsewhere. But it can insist that an agency’s judgment rest on a real record and an honest explanation, and that the court never mistake a confident forecast for an established fact. I’d carry that to the bench.

(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)
 
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