Edited answer, because I don't want to mis-answer a case
Question 1:
Judge Srinivasan, before joining the bench, you represented Rio Tinto in litigation where the corporation argued that it was immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute, even when the alleged conduct involved grave human rights violations.
I understand that an attorney represents the position of his client. But you are now seeking a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, so the American people deserve to understand your own judicial philosophy.
Do you believe corporations should ever enjoy categorical immunity from civil accountability for conduct that would expose an individual to liability? How do you reconcile granting corporations the protections and privileges of legal personhood while denying victims a remedy when those same corporations are accused of enabling torture, forced labor or other serious abuses?
Second question:
Judge Srinivasan, Citizens United rests partly on the conclusion that unlimited independent spending by corporations does not create corruption or even the appearance of corruption.
Do you believe that conclusion reflects political reality? When corporations can spend extraordinary sums influencing elections, gain access to elected officials and then lobby those same officials on taxes, regulations and government contracts, what constitutional authority does Congress retain to protect democratic self government from concentrated corporate power?
Senator Callahan, thank you. You’ve drawn exactly the right line — between what a lawyer argues and what a judge believes — and then asked me to speak on my own side of it. I’ll do that as far as the chair I hope to sit in allows, and I’ll tell you honestly where the line falls.
On corporate immunity and a victim’s remedy. You’re right that I represented Rio Tinto. I argued for the company in the Ninth Circuit, in litigation brought by residents of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and the principal argument I pressed there was that the plaintiffs should have been required to pursue their claims in the courts of Papua New Guinea before coming to ours. I also represented Exxon in the D.C. Circuit, in the case Senator Bailey placed before you a moment ago, where the court rejected the corporate-immunity argument I had advanced. I won’t minimize either matter. Both involved grave allegations, and both clients took positions that the plaintiffs, and many people in this room, found hard to accept. They were my clients’ positions, argued as an advocate is obliged to argue them, and I’d ask you to weigh them as that.
Now to the principle, which is what you actually asked about, and which I can speak to because it goes to method rather than to a case I’d have to decide. You ask whether a corporation should
ever enjoy categorical immunity from civil accountability for conduct that would expose a natural person to liability. Speaking of how I approach such questions: categorical immunities are disfavored in our law, and for good reason. When one exists, it is almost always because a legislature created it, deliberately and in words — sovereign immunity, certain official immunities, and the like — and a court should be slow to invent one the legislature did not write. The default of the common law, and of most of our statutes, is that a wrongdoer answers for the wrong. So I’d not start from a presumption that a corporate form, by itself, is a shield against accountability.
But I want to be candid about where that general principle stops and a real case begins, because the honest answer has two parts. Whether a
particular statute reaches corporations is a question of
that statute — its text, its history, whom Congress meant to bind. The Alien Tort Statute is one such question, and it is precisely the one that may return to the Supreme Court, so it’s the one I must not answer from this chair. The reconciliation you ask about — between the privileges the law extends to corporations and the remedies it owes their victims — is real, and I won’t pretend it dissolves on contact. I’d only say that it is resolved statute by statute and doctrine by doctrine, not by a single slogan. “Corporations are people” decides nothing; neither does “corporations are never people.” The law has always treated the corporate form as an instrument — granting it some human attributes, withholding others — and the whole work is in sorting which is which, in each context, honestly.
On Citizens United. Here I can be more forthcoming, because you’re asking me to describe a decided precedent and the disagreement within it — not to pre-commit on a live case. I’ll mark the one place I have to stop.
You’ve stated the holding fairly. The majority concluded that independent expenditures, as distinct from direct contributions to a candidate, do not give rise to
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the First Amendment therefore does not permit banning them based on the speaker’s corporate identity. And you’ve put your finger on exactly the premise the dissenters contested. Justice Stevens, writing for four, argued that the majority had defined corruption too narrowly — that it had set aside Congress’s considered judgment, built on a long record, that vast concentrations of wealth distort the democratic process in ways that go beyond an envelope of cash for a vote. That was not a quiet disagreement. It was a fundamental one about both the Constitution and the facts of political life, and I won’t flatten it by pretending the case was easy or the vote lopsided. It was neither.
Do I believe the majority’s empirical conclusion reflects political reality? Senator, that is the heart of a question that is litigated still, and it is the one thing I should not answer — because to tell you my view of whether
Citizens United got the facts right is to tell you how I’d lean if asked to revisit it, and parties with real cases are entitled to a judge who hasn’t announced the answer in advance. What I can tell you is how I’d approach it:
Citizens United is a precedent of the Court, and
stare decisis means it is owed real weight — it is not discarded because a Justice would have voted the other way. But that weight is not infinite. The doctrine itself recognizes that a precedent’s factual premises can be tested against experience, and an argument that a decision’s real-world assumptions have not held up is exactly the kind of argument that can be made to a court. Whether it should prevail is for the case, on a record, with both sides heard.
On your narrower question — what authority Congress retains — I can answer plainly, because that’s a matter of existing law and not a forecast.
Citizens United left a good deal standing. It did not disturb the constitutionality of limits on
direct contributions to candidates, which the Court has long upheld on precisely the anti-corruption rationale you invoke. It expressly affirmed Congress’s power to require
disclosure and disclaimer — by an eight-to-one margin, in fact — so the electorate can know who is paying for the speech aimed at it. And it did nothing to limit the power to prosecute actual bribery, which remains a crime. So the field in which Congress may still act to protect self-government from
quid pro quo corruption is not barren. How much more it may do — whether the anti-distortion interest the dissent urged can support more than that — is the contested ground, and it is contested in court, which is where I’ll leave it.
Thank you, Senator. These sit right on the seam between what a nominee may discuss and what he’s bound to reserve, and I’ve tried to give you everything on my side of that seam and to be honest about why I stop where I do.
(OOC: Fictional, written for the in-game purposes of representing Sri Srinivasan in his nomination to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Not a real statement by Judge Srinivasan.)